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  the	  Direction	  of	  Eddy	  Nahmias	  
	  
ABSTRACT	  
Jaegwon	  Kim’s	  Exclusion	  Problem	  holds	  that	  the	  nonreductive	  physicalist	  position	  is	  untenable.	  If	  the	  
mental	  and	  the	  physical	  are	  distinct	  and	  both	  cause	  their	  effects,	  then	  it	  seems	  that	  their	  effects	  were	  
caused	  twice	  over.	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  nonreductive	  physicalist	  should	  reject	  the	  Exclusion	  principle—a	  po-­‐
sition	  called	  Causal	  Compatibilism.	  I	  appeal	  to	  our	  concepts	  of	  causal	  sufficiency	  and	  difference	  making	  
in	  order	  to	  distinguish	  cases	  of	  mental	  causation,	  epiphenomenalism,	  and	  overdetermination.	  I	  appeal	  
to	  James	  Woodward’s	  Interventionist	  framework	  to	  individuate	  causal	  difference-­‐makers.	  Mental	  causa-­‐
tion	  involves	  two	  sufficient	  causes	  but	  only	  one	  difference-­‐maker.	  Given	  that	  overdetermination	  in-­‐
volves	  two	  sufficient	  causes	  and	  two	  difference-­‐makers,	  the	  Exclusion	  principle	  fails	  to	  distinguish	  be-­‐
tween	  overdetermination	  and	  mental	  causation	  and	  so,	  it	  is	  false.	  I	  conclude	  that	  by	  rejecting	  the	  Exclu-­‐
sion	  principle,	  the	  nonreductive	  physicalist	  can	  get	  out	  of	  the	  Exclusion	  Problem.	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1 INTRODUCTION	  	  
	   Nonreductive	  physicalists	  are	  sometimes	  accused	  of	  holding	  a	  set	  of	  inconsistent	  theses.	  The	  
non-­‐reductive	  physicalist	  (henceforth	  NRP)	  holds	  that	  the	  mental	  is	  “irreducible”	  (or	  distinct	  from)	  the	  
physical,	  but	  that	  the	  mental	  is	  nothing	  “over	  and	  above”	  the	  physical.1	  Most	  NRPs	  also	  hold	  that	  the	  
mental	  qua	  mental	  is	  efficacious	  and	  that	  mental	  causes	  do	  not	  overdetermine	  their	  effects.	  Yet,	  by	  add-­‐
ing	  the	  prima	  facie	  reasonable	  Exclusion	  principle—that	  any	  event	  with	  more	  than	  one	  sufficient	  and	  
distinct	  cause	  is	  overdetermined—it	  seems	  that	  the	  NRP	  is	  committed	  to	  an	  inconsistent	  set	  of	  princi-­‐
ples.	  Here	  is	  the	  putative	  tension:	  The	  more	  the	  NRP	  goes	  out	  of	  her	  way	  to	  establish	  the	  distinctness	  of	  
the	  mental	  and	  the	  physical,	  the	  more	  the	  putative	  mental	  causes	  seem	  to	  overdetermine	  their	  effects;	  
similarly,	  the	  more	  she	  emphasizes	  the	  tight	  relationship	  between	  them,	  the	  less	  efficacious	  the	  mental	  
qua	  mental	  seems.	  Jaegwon	  Kim’s	  Exclusion	  Argument	  uses	  the	  “tension”	  between	  these	  theses	  to	  ar-­‐
gue,	  conditionally,	  for	  reductive	  physicalism	  (2005,	  37).	  
Kim	  argues	  that	  the	  NRP	  can	  only	  resolve	  the	  tension	  in	  her	  view	  by	  accepting	  one	  horn	  of	  the	  
following	  dilemma:	  allowing	  an	  overabundance	  of	  causes	  or	  admitting	  that	  mental	  causes	  qua	  mental	  
are	  only	  apparent	  causes.	  Kim	  believes	  the	  first	  horn	  of	  the	  dilemma	  (the	  Overdetermination	  Horn)	  is	  a	  
“nonstarter”	  and	  “absurd”	  (1998,	  65;	  1993a,	  281	  &	  354).	  He	  assumes	  that	  mental	  causation	  simply	  is	  not	  
a	  case	  of	  genuine	  overdetermination.	  Ultimately,	  Kim	  argues	  that	  the	  NRP	  is	  left	  with	  the	  second	  horn	  of	  
the	  dilemma	  (the	  Epiphenomenalism	  Horn).	  
I	  will	  introduce	  the	  Exclusion	  Argument	  as	  a	  dilemma	  for	  NRP	  between	  overdetermination	  and	  
epiphenomenalism	  in	  section	  1.1.	  In	  section	  1.2,	  I	  will	  discuss	  Kim’s	  use	  of	  the	  causal	  inheritance	  princi-­‐
ple	  and	  his	  assumption	  of	  the	  production	  view	  of	  causation.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See,	  e.g.,	  Wilson	  2010a.	  
 2	  
In	  section	  2.1,	  I	  will	  introduce	  the	  distinction	  between	  our	  causal	  concepts	  of	  sufficiency	  and	  dif-­‐
ference	  making,	  which	  will	  be	  useful	  for	  my	  own	  solution	  to	  the	  Exclusion	  problem.	  In	  section	  2.2,	  I	  will	  
then	  describe	  the	  following	  technical	  notions	  from	  James	  Woodward’s	  Interventionist	  account	  of	  causa-­‐
tion:	  the	  notion	  of	  possible	  and	  impossible	  interventions	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  causal	  arrows	  in	  
the	  causal	  graphs	  and	  distinct	  mechanisms	  in	  the	  actual	  world.	  	  
I	  will	  use	  the	  distinction	  between	  causal	  sufficiency	  and	  difference	  making	  in	  section	  2.3	  to	  ar-­‐
gue	  for	  treating	  the	  mental	  and	  the	  physical	  as	  one	  variable	  when	  building	  a	  causal	  graph	  to	  represent	  
the	  causal	  difference	  making	  relationship	  in	  cases	  of	  mental	  causation.	  In	  arguing	  for	  one	  particular	  
causal	  graph	  and	  its	  associated	  intervention,	  I	  will	  describe	  and	  reject	  other	  proposed	  causal	  graphs	  and	  
interventions.	  Of	  the	  options	  I	  present,	  only	  my	  proposed	  causal	  graph	  is	  well	  formed:	  it	  is	  modular,	  
each	  variable	  can	  be	  intervened	  upon,	  and	  each	  causal	  arrow	  represents	  only	  one	  distinct	  mechanism.	  	  
In	  section	  3.1,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  my	  solution	  requires	  treating	  the	  mental	  and	  
the	  physical	  as	  one	  variable	  with	  respect	  to	  causal	  difference	  making,	  the	  mental	  and	  the	  physical	  are	  
still	  nonetheless	  individually	  sufficient	  and	  distinct.	  In	  section	  3.2,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  my	  solution	  allows	  the	  
NRP	  to	  explain	  the	  disanalogy	  between	  ordinary	  cases	  of	  overdetermination	  and	  mental	  causation.	  Here	  
is	  the	  basic	  idea:	  If	  the	  NRP	  distinguishes	  cases	  by	  both	  the	  number	  of	  sufficient	  causes	  and	  the	  number	  
of	  causal	  pathways2,	  contra	  Kim,	  she	  can	  suggest	  a	  third	  option	  between	  overdetermination	  and	  epi-­‐
phenomenalism:	  two	  sufficient	  causes,	  but	  only	  one	  causal	  pathway.	  By	  cashing	  out	  this	  metaphor	  in	  
terms	  of	  causal	  sufficiency	  and	  causal	  difference	  making,	  the	  NRP	  can	  hold	  that	  the	  mental	  and	  the	  
physical	  are	  each	  distinct	  and	  sufficient	  causes,	  but	  only	  together	  are	  they	  difference-­‐makers.	  Then	  in	  
section	  3.3,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  my	  solution	  amounts	  to	  denying	  the	  Exclusion	  principle.	  
In	  section	  4.1	  and	  4.2,	  I	  will	  consider	  some	  objections	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  individuation	  of	  
causal	  pathways	  will	  be	  vague	  and	  that	  the	  proposed	  solution	  violates	  the	  NRP’s	  commitment	  to	  Clo-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  This	  phrase	  will	  be	  explained	  later	  in	  the	  paper	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  represented	  by	  causal	  arrows	  in	  
causal	  graphs.	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sure.	  Finally,	  in	  section	  4.3,	  I	  will	  conclude	  that	  Kim’s	  presentation	  of	  the	  Exclusion	  Problem	  involves	  a	  
false	  dichotomy,	  which	  unnecessarily	  restricts	  the	  solution	  space	  to	  the	  Exclusion	  Problem	  and	  misleads	  
him	  into	  arguing	  that	  NRP	  is	  untenable.	  
1.1 Kim’s	  Exclusion	  Problem	  
This	  section	  is	  drawn	  from	  Kim’s	  (2005,	  33-­‐44;	  2008,	  111)	  to	  present	  his	  Exclusion	  Argument.	  
The	  dilemma	  begins	  by	  assuming	  the	  NRP’s	  position:	  Closure	  (required	  by	  physicalism)	  and	  Distinctness	  
(required	  by	  non-­‐reductionism).	  	  
Closure	   If	  a	  physical	  event3	  has	  a	  cause	  at	  t,	  then	  it	  has	  a	  physical	  cause	  at	  t.	  
Distinctness	  	   	   Mental	  events	  are	  numerically	  distinct	  from	  physical	  events.	  
The	  NRP	  cannot	  reject	  either	  Closure	  or	  Distinctness	  on	  pain	  of	  collapsing	  NRP	  into	  dualism	  or	  
reductive	  physicalism,	  respectively.4	  Merely	  by	  adding	  some	  plausible	  principles—Exclusion,	  Efficacy,	  
and	  No	  Overdetermination—we’ve	  got	  the	  Exclusion	  Problem:	  	  
Exclusion	   If	  an	  event	  at	  t	  has	  more	  than	  one	  distinct,	  sufficient	  cause	  at	  t,	  then	  it	  is	  genu-­‐
inely	  overdetermined.	  
Efficacy	  	   	   Mental	  events	  have	  causal	  efficacy—that	  is,	  their	  	  
instantiations	  can,	  and	  do,	  cause	  other	  events,	  both	  mental	  and	  physical	  to	  be	  
instantiated.	  
No	  Overdetermination	  Mental	  causation	  does	  not	  involve	  overdetermination	  in	  the	  	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Following	  Kim,	  I	  aim	  to	  stay	  neutral	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  argument	  is	  targeting	  properties	  or	  events,	  so	  I	  will	  use	  
whichever	  sounds	  the	  most	  natural.	  Some	  Causal	  Compatibilists	  (e.g.,	  Bennett	  2003)	  take	  distinctness	  to	  imply	  a	  
modal	  distinctness	  between	  mental	  and	  physical	  states.	  Here	  I	  only	  hope	  to	  maintain	  the	  minimal	  thesis	  that	  the	  
mental	  and	  the	  physical	  are	  not	  identical.	  Note	  that	  the	  acceptance	  of	  distinctness	  as	  it	  is	  phrased	  here	  does	  not	  
commit	  the	  NRP	  to	  the	  dualist	  notion	  that	  the	  mental	  and	  the	  physical	  states	  are	  independent	  substances.	  One	  
way	  to	  flesh	  out	  the	  distinctness	  of	  the	  mental	  and	  the	  physical	  without	  committing	  oneself	  to	  the	  independence	  
implied	  by	  substance	  dualism	  is	  to	  accept	  that	  a	  supervenience	  relation	  holds	  between	  mental	  and	  physical	  states.	  
When	  A	  supervenes	  on	  B,	  there	  can	  be	  no	  change	  in	  A	  without	  a	  change	  in	  B	  (McLaughlin	  and	  Bennett	  2011).	  By	  
metaphysical	  necessity,	  any	  change	  in	  A	  will	  be	  accompanied	  by	  a	  change	  in	  B.	  
4	  It	  may	  be	  possible	  for	  the	  NRP	  to	  reject	  Closure	  by	  arguing	  that	  the	  laws	  of	  physics	  make	  no	  appeal	  to	  causality,	  
but	  this	  discussion	  is	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper.	  
 4	  
Adapted	  from	  Kim’s	  (1998)	  Supervenience	  argument,	  the	  Exclusion	  Argument	  goes	  as	  follows5:	  
(1) Assume	  mind-­‐body	  supervenience:	  Mental	  properties	  supervene	  on	  physical	  properties	  in	  
the	  sense	  that	  if	  something	  instantiates	  any	  mental	  property	  M	  at	  t,	  there	  is	  a	  physical	  base	  
property	  P	  such	  that	  the	  thing	  has	  P	  at	  t,	  and	  necessarily	  any	  thing	  with	  P	  at	  a	  time	  has	  M	  at	  
that	  time.	  
(2) Efficacy:	  Suppose	  that	  an	  instance	  of	  a	  mental	  property	  M	  causes	  another	  instance	  of	  a	  
mental	  property	  M*	  to	  be	  instantiated.	  
(3) M*	  has	  a	  physical	  supervenience	  base	  (by	  1).	  
(4) M*	  is	  either	  instantiated	  in	  this	  case	  because:	  (a)	  ex	  hypothesi,	  M	  caused	  M*	  to	  be	  instanti-­‐
ated,	  or	  (b)	  P*,	  the	  physical	  supervenience	  base	  of	  M*,	  is	  instantiated	  on	  this	  occasion.	  
(5) M	  caused	  M*	  by	  causing	  P*,	  or	  mental-­‐to-­‐mental	  causation	  implies	  mental-­‐to-­‐physical	  cau-­‐
sation.	  
(6) But	  M	  itself	  has	  a	  physical	  supervenience	  base	  P,	  which	  is	  also	  the	  cause	  of	  P*	  (by	  Closure).	  
(7) Distinctness:	  P	  and	  M	  are	  numerically	  distinct	  properties.	  	  
(8) So,	  P	  caused	  P*,	  and	  M	  supervenes	  on	  P	  and	  M*	  supervenes	  on	  P*.	  
(9) 	  Exclusion:	  If	  an	  event	  at	  t	  has	  more	  than	  one	  distinct,	  sufficient	  cause	  at	  t,	  then	  it	  is	  genu-­‐
inely	  overdetermined.	  	  
(10) 	  No	  Overdetermination:	  But	  mental	  causation	  does	  not	  involve	  the	  type	  of	  genuine	  overde-­‐
termination	  found	  in	  firing	  squad	  cases.	  
(11) 	  So,	  M-­‐to-­‐M*	  and	  M-­‐to-­‐P*	  causal	  relations	  are	  only	  apparent,	  and	  this	  appearance	  arises	  
from	  the	  genuine	  causal	  process	  from	  P	  to	  P*.	  
(12) 	  Therefore,	  the	  NRP	  position	  is	  untenable;	  Efficacy,	  Closure,	  Distinctness,	  Exclusion,	  and	  No	  
Overdetermination	  are	  inconsistent.	  
	  
Kim’s	  ultimate	  recommendation	  is	  to	  give	  up	  on	  the	  nonreductive	  part	  of	  the	  NRP’s	  view	  
(namely,	  Distinctness)	  and	  accept	  reductive	  physicalism,	  which	  holds	  that	  mental	  properties	  are	  not	  dis-­‐
tinct	  from	  physical	  properties	  and	  inherit	  their	  causal	  powers	  from	  their	  supervenience	  base,	  given	  that	  
the	  mental	  can	  be	  successfully	  reduced.6	  The	  NRP	  might	  question	  Kim’s	  insistence	  that	  she	  must	  give	  up	  






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Here	  I’m	  leaving	  aside	  explanatory	  versions	  of	  the	  argument.	  	  
6	  Throughout	  I	  will	  ignore	  Kim’s	  position	  on	  qualia,	  which	  is	  that	  qualia	  are	  not	  functionalizable,	  and	  so	  they	  are	  
irreducible.	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Here	  is	  Kim’s	  diagram	  illustrating	  the	  Exclusion	  Problem	  (2005,	  45)7:	  
	  
	  
Figure	  1.	  Kim’s	  Diagram.	  The	  arrows	  with	  diamond-­‐heads	  represent	  the	  relation	  of	  superven-­‐
ience	  with	  the	  diamond	  facing	  the	  supervening	  event.	  For	  each	  set	  of	  nodes	  related	  by	  superven-­‐
ience,	  the	  individual	  nodes	  are	  distinct	  but	  not	  independent.	  The	  arrows	  represent	  causal	  rela-­‐
tionships	  with	  the	  arrowhead	  facing	  the	  effect.	  	  
	  
Kim’s	  main	  concern	  is	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  non-­‐overdetermining	  arrow	  from	  M	  to	  P*.	  	  Kim’s	  dia-­‐
gram	  leads	  one	  to	  believe	  there	  are	  only	  two	  options	  for	  the	  NRP:	  overdetermination	  as	  depicted	  in	  Fig-­‐
ure	  1	  or	  epiphenomenalism	  where	  the	  arrow	  from	  M	  to	  P*	  is	  only	  apparent.	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  these	  are	  
not	  the	  only	  options—instead,	  the	  NRP	  can	  reject	  the	  Exclusion	  principle.	  
1.2 Kim’s	  Causal	  Inheritance	  Principle	  and	  the	  Production	  View	  of	  Causation	  
Kim	  (1993a)	  appeals	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  causal	  inheritance	  to	  explain	  why	  both	  Closure	  and	  Ex-­‐
clusion	  result	  in	  the	  epiphenomenalism	  of	  M	  with	  respect	  to	  P*.	  He	  defines	  the	  causal	  inheritance	  prin-­‐
ciple	  as	  follows	  (1993c,	  326;	  italics	  removed):	  	  
if	  mental	  property	  M	  is	  realized	  in	  a	  system	  at	  t	  in	  virtue	  of	  physical	  realization	  base	  P,	  
the	  causal	  powers	  of	  this	  instance	  of	  M	  are	  identical	  with	  the	  causal	  powers	  of	  P.	  
	  
Kim	  thinks	  that	  anyone	  who	  accepts	  this	  principle	  is	  denying	  distinctness	  and	  thus,	  a	  reductionist	  
(1993a,	  356).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Here	  I’m	  leaving	  aside	  issues	  about	  mental-­‐to-­‐mental	  causation	  because	  each	  version	  of	  Kim’s	  Exclusion	  Argu-­‐
ment	  turns	  crucially	  on	  the	  status	  of	  mental-­‐to-­‐physical	  causation	  (or	  “downward	  causation”).	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Suppose	  instead	  that	  the	  nonreductive	  physicalist	  chooses	  to	  deny	  the	  principle	  of	  causal	  inheri-­‐
tance.	  Kim	  thinks	  that	  anyone	  who	  wants	  to	  deny	  this	  principle	  is	  thereby	  committed	  to	  emergent	  causal	  
powers.	  In	  another	  paper,	  Kim	  describes	  this	  principle	  in	  terms	  of	  Alexander’s	  dictum,	  to	  be	  real	  means	  
to	  have	  causal	  powers	  (1993a,	  350;	  his	  italics	  removed	  and	  my	  italics	  added):	  
on	  Alexander’s	  dictum,	  that	  mental	  properties	  bring	  with	  them	  new	  causal	  powers,	  
powers	  that	  no	  underlying	  physical-­‐biological	  properties	  can	  deliver.	  For	  unless	  mental-­‐
ity	  made	  causal	  contributions	  that	  are	  genuinely	  novel,	  the	  claim	  that	  it	  is	  a	  distinct	  and	  
irreducible	  phenomenon	  over	  and	  beyond	  physical-­‐biological	  phenomena	  would	  be	  hol-­‐
low	  and	  empty.	  To	  be	  real,	  Alexander	  has	  said,	  is	  to	  have	  causal	  powers;	  to	  be	  real,	  new,	  
and	  irreducible,	  therefore,	  must	  be	  to	  have	  new,	  irreducible	  causal	  powers.	  
	  
Kim	  is	  not	  the	  only	  one	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  NRP	  usually	  holds	  the	  causal	  inheritance	  principle.	  
Michael	  Baumgartner	  illustrates	  the	  way	  that	  many	  NRP	  think	  about	  the	  additional	  causal	  powers	  of	  the	  
mental	  (2013:	  4;	  emphasis	  added):	  	  
Many	  non-­‐reductive	  physicalists	  additionally	  assume	  something	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  the	  
Eleatic	  Principle	  (cf.	  e.g.	  Armstrong	  1997;	  Oddie	  1982)	  according	  to	  which	  everything	  
that	  exists	  (in	  space	  and	  time)	  has	  causal	  powers.	  From	  the	  fact	  that	  mental	  properties	  
constitute	  an	  ontological	  category	  that	  is	  distinct	  and	  nonreducible	  to	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  
physical	  […]	  they	  then	  infer	  that	  mental	  properties	  have	  their	  own	  non-­‐reducible	  causal	  
powers.	  That	  is,	  mental	  properties	  do	  not	  have	  causal	  powers	  merely	  by	  virtue	  of	  being	  
physically	  realized	  but	  by	  their	  own	  right,	  i.e.	  they	  have	  genuinely	  mental	  causal	  powers.	  
This	  is	  known	  as	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  Causal	  Autonomy	  of	  the	  Mental	  (CAM)	  (cf.	  e.g.	  
Fodor	  1989,	  Lowe	  1993,	  Antony	  2007;	  Menzies	  and	  List	  2010).	  Here	  is	  the	  version	  of	  the	  
principle	  advanced	  in	  Menzies	  and	  List	  (2010,	  111):	  	  
(CAM)	  For	  some	  mental	  property	  M	  and	  physical	  property	  P,	  where	  an	  instance	  of	  prop-­‐
erty	  M	  is	  realized	  by	  an	  instance	  of	  property	  P,	  the	  causal	  powers	  of	  the	  M-­‐instance	  are	  
not	  a	  subset	  of	  those	  of	  the	  P-­‐instance.	  
	  
Notice	  that	  in	  this	  quote,	  Baumgartner	  suggests	  that	  many	  NRP	  jump	  from	  a	  principle	  that	  sug-­‐
gests	  everything	  that	  exists	  has	  causal	  powers	  (Kim	  calls	  this	  Alexander’s	  dictum)	  to	  the	  CAM	  principle.	  
However,	  it	  is	  unclear	  that	  NRP	  should	  accept	  that	  each	  ontologically	  distinct	  category	  has	  distinct	  and	  
nonreducible	  causal	  powers.	  As	  long	  as	  the	  mental	  still	  has	  causal	  powers,	  it	  does	  not	  violate	  the	  Eleatic	  
Principle,	  as	  Baumgartner	  has	  stated	  it.	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  take	  a	  stand	  on	  the	  truth	  or	  falsity	  of	  CAM,	  but	  I	  
do	  wish	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  NRP	  does	  not	  need	  to	  accept	  it.	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Kim	  (2002,	  675)	  explicitly	  admits	  that	  he	  assumes	  a	  production	  view	  of	  causation,	  which	  states	  
that	  causation	  involves	  a	  physical	  causal	  process	  that	  transmits	  energy	  to	  or	  marks	  the	  effect	  (e.g.,	  
Salmon	  1984,	  Dowe	  2000).	  Production	  views	  are	  taken	  to	  rule	  out	  omissions	  as	  causes.	  Throughout	  his	  
writings,	  it	  is	  quite	  clear	  that	  Kim	  relies	  on	  a	  production	  view	  of	  causation	  throughout	  the	  various	  forms	  
of	  the	  Exclusion	  argument.	  He	  also	  appeals	  to	  notions	  of	  causal	  work:	  “Given	  that	  P	  has	  a	  physical	  cause	  
P*,	  what	  causal	  work	  is	  left	  for	  M	  to	  contribute?”	  (1998,	  37).	  He	  also	  suggests	  that	  the	  “causal	  contribu-­‐
tion”	  of	  M	  is	  “totally	  mysterious”	  (2005b,	  48).	  Kim’s	  conclusion	  is	  that	  since	  M	  does	  no	  additional	  causal	  
work	  to	  bring	  about	  P*	  (and	  accepting	  that	  mental	  causation	  does	  not	  involve	  overdetermination),	  M	  
does	  not	  actually	  cause	  P.	  As	  Kim	  sometimes	  says,	  the	  mental	  is	  dispensable	  (1998,	  45).	  Some	  have	  ar-­‐
gued	  that	  because	  Kim	  assumes	  a	  production	  view	  of	  causation,	  the	  Exclusion	  problem	  could	  be	  re-­‐
solved	  by	  adopting	  a	  different	  view	  of	  causation.	  
Loewer	  (2007)	  has	  argued	  that	  Kim’s	  assumption	  of	  a	  production	  view	  of	  causation	  is	  problem-­‐
atic	  by	  appealing	  to	  Bertrand	  Russell’s	  argument	  that	  productive	  causal	  relations	  do	  not	  appear	  in	  the	  
laws	  of	  physics.8	  Loewer	  (ibid.,	  16)	  states:	  
My	  proposal	  is	  not	  that	  Lewis’	  [counterfactual]	  influence	  account	  perfectly	  captures	  our	  
intuitive	  concept	  of	  causation.	  But	  I	  do	  claim	  that	  causation	  as	  influence	  is	  near	  enough	  
to	  our	  folk	  conception	  of	  mental	  causation	  to	  underwrite	  the	  role	  of	  causation	  in	  folk	  
psychology,	  rational	  deliberation,	  action	  theory	  and	  so	  on.	  
	  
He	  then	  argues	  that	  our	  best	  understanding	  of	  causation	  (or	  at	  least	  the	  folk	  view	  of	  causation,	  which	  is	  
supposed	  to	  ground	  agency	  attributions)	  is	  found	  in	  dependence	  views	  (or	  the	  counterfactual	  influence	  
account	  described	  by	  Loewer	  above).	  
However,	  it	  is	  unclear	  what	  is	  actually	  our	  best	  theory	  of	  causation	  (or	  even	  our	  best	  theory	  of	  
the	  folk	  theory	  of	  causation),	  so	  it	  would	  be	  hasty	  to	  rule	  out	  production	  views.9	  Instead,	  I	  take	  Karen	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  This	  is	  a	  contentious	  point,	  see	  Frisch	  2009.	  For	  arguments	  supporting	  Russell’s	  view,	  see	  Norton	  2007,	  2009.	  
9	  On	  the	  actual	  nature	  of	  causation,	  see	  Lewis	  (1973)	  for	  support	  of	  dependence	  views	  and	  see	  Dowe	  (2000)	  for	  
support	  of	  production	  views.	  On	  the	  folk	  concept	  of	  causation,	  see	  Gopnik	  and	  Schultz	  (2004)	  for	  some	  support	  of	  
dependence	  views	  and	  see	  Wolff	  (2008)	  for	  support	  of	  production	  views.	  
 8	  
Bennett’s	  (2008)	  line	  on	  this:	  choosing	  a	  theory	  of	  causation	  in	  order	  to	  solve	  the	  Exclusion	  problem	  is	  
just	  the	  wrong	  way	  to	  go	  about	  it.	  She	  says:	  “Whether	  it	  can	  [i.e.,	  dependence	  accounts	  of	  causation	  can	  
help	  alleviate	  worries	  like	  the	  Exclusion	  problem]	  or	  not	  depends	  on	  whether	  it	  is	  a	  good	  enough	  as	  an	  
account	  of	  causation	  full	  stop	  (2008,	  24).	  Even	  Kim	  feels	  that	  the	  Exclusion	  problem	  will	  exist	  regardless	  
of	  one’s	  theory	  of	  causation	  (1998,	  43).	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  one’s	  theory	  of	  causation	  is	  irrelevant	  to	  
the	  Exclusion	  problem,	  but	  rather	  that	  one’s	  theory	  of	  causation	  alone	  will	  not	  solve	  it.	  	  Hence,	  we	  need	  
to	  consider	  other	  ways	  to	  approach	  the	  problem.	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  admitting	  the	  move	  from	  rejecting	  the	  causal	  inheritance	  principle	  to	  
positing	  emergent	  properties	  and	  holding	  a	  production	  view	  of	  causation	  are	  not	  required	  to	  get	  the	  
Exclusion	  Argument	  off	  the	  ground	  (contra,	  e.g.,	  Loewer	  2007).	  Given	  that	  neither	  view	  is	  necessary	  for	  
the	  Exclusion	  Argument,	  any	  part	  of	  the	  argument	  that	  rests	  on	  one	  of	  these	  principles	  is	  controversial	  
at	  best.	  In	  fact,	  the	  NRP	  is	  able	  to	  deny	  such	  grounding	  if	  she,	  for	  example,	  holds	  a	  dependence	  view	  of	  
causation.	  In	  doing	  so,	  she	  will	  not	  have	  solved	  the	  Exclusion	  Problem.	  So,	  in	  what	  follows,	  I	  will	  present	  
an	  independent	  solution	  to	  the	  Exclusion	  Argument.	  However,	  when	  Kim’s	  argument	  relies	  on	  contro-­‐










2 THE	  CAUSAL	  COMPATIBILIST	  APPEAL	  TO	  INTERVENTIONISM	  
In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  appeal	  to	  a	  distinction	  between	  causal	  sufficiency	  and	  difference	  making	  
that	  will	  help	  set	  up	  a	  NRP	  solution	  to	  the	  Exclusion	  problem.	  I	  will	  introduce	  some	  more	  formal	  notions	  
of	  difference	  making	  in	  order	  to	  describe	  the	  different	  ways	  that	  our	  concepts	  of	  causal	  sufficiency	  and	  
causal	  difference	  making	  apply	  to	  mental	  causation.	  
Karen	  Bennett	  (2003)	  and	  others	  (e.g.,	  Horgan	  2001)	  use	  the	  label	  ‘Compatibilism’	  for	  the	  view	  
that	  the	  mental	  and	  the	  physical	  do	  not	  causally	  compete,	  but	  both	  are	  nonetheless	  efficacious.	  Since	  
the	  Causal	  Compatibilist	  accepts	  both	  No	  Overdetermination	  and	  Efficacy,	  and	  given	  the	  five	  theses	  are	  
inconsistent,	  she	  will	  have	  to	  reject	  Exclusion.	  Kim	  assumes	  that	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  have	  more	  than	  one	  
cause	  per	  causal	  pathway,	  which	  leads	  him	  to	  support	  the	  application	  of	  the	  Exclusion	  principle	  to	  all	  
cases	  that	  do	  not	  involve	  overdetermination.	  	  
Recall	  Kim’s	  diagram	  of	  the	  Exclusion	  Problem	  (Figure	  1).	  Both	  (non-­‐causal)	  supervenience	  rela-­‐
tions	  and	  causal	  relations	  are	  represented	  with	  arrows	  (with	  distinct	  types	  of	  arrowheads),	  which	  has	  
the	  potential	  to	  be	  misleading.	  Perhaps	  the	  diagram	  should	  look	  something	  more	  like	  the	  following10:	  
	  
Figure	  2.	  A	  New	  Diagram.	  M	  and	  P	  are	  distinct	  causes	  and	  M*	  and	  P*	  are	  distinct	  effects.	  There	  
is	  only	  one	  causal	  relationship	  between	  M	  to	  M*	  (and	  since	  P	  and	  P*	  contain	  M	  and	  M*,	  respec-­‐
tively,	  the	  causal	  relationship	  also	  between	  P	  to	  P*).	  	  
Both	  M	  and	  P	  are	  distinct	  and	  sufficient	  causes	  of	  M*	  and	  P*,	  respectively11,	  but	  there	  is	  only	  one	  causal	  
pathway	  between	  the	  two.	  The	  NRP	  needs	  to	  show	  that	  causal	  difference	  making	  and	  causal	  sufficiency	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  This	  diagram	  is	  originally	  found	  in	  Alyssa	  Ney’s	  (2010)	  description	  of	  Sydney	  Shoemaker’s	  view.	  It	  could	  also	  rep-­‐
resent	  Jessica	  Wilson’s	  (2010b)	  proper	  subset	  of	  causal	  powers	  view.	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come	  apart	  in	  particular	  cases,	  so	  she	  can	  rely	  on	  the	  individuation	  of	  causal	  events	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  
‘causal	  pathways’	  and	  ‘sufficient	  causes.’	  I	  will	  define	  causal	  pathways	  as	  difference-­‐makers	  in	  a	  later	  
section.	  As	  Figure	  2	  suggests,	  there	  is	  an	  important	  sense	  in	  which	  the	  term	  ‘downward	  causation’	  is	  
problematic.	  Downward	  causation	  is	  mental-­‐to-­‐physical	  causation	  and	  it	  is	  represented	  by	  the	  arrow	  on	  
Kim’s	  diagram	  (Figure	  1)	  from	  M	  to	  P*	  and	  figures	  into	  premise	  (5)	  of	  the	  Exclusion	  Argument.	  In	  Figure	  
2,	  the	  supervenient	  properties	  and	  their	  supervenience	  bases	  are	  no	  longer	  represented	  on	  different	  
“levels”	  of	  the	  diagram.	  Further,	  Figure	  2	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  unclear	  why	  so-­‐called	  “downward	  causation”	  
requires	  an	  extra	  causal	  arrow	  (or	  more	  causal	  “oomph”	  according	  to	  the	  production	  view	  of	  causa-­‐
tion).12	  So,	  figure	  2	  has	  the	  added	  benefit	  of	  removing	  an	  unnecessary	  reliance	  on	  the	  production	  view	  
of	  causation.	  	  
	   I	  would	  like	  to	  stress	  that	  I	  am	  not	  suggesting	  Figure	  2	  is	  the	  only	  way	  to	  represent	  the	  causal	  
structure	  of	  cases	  of	  mental	  causation	  (without	  relying	  on	  “levels”).	  Perhaps	  Figure	  2	  lends	  itself	  too	  eas-­‐
ily	  to	  particular	  nonreductive	  physicalist	  positions	  (i.e.,	  subset	  views	  of	  causal	  powers)	  and	  some	  NRP	  
might	  find	  these	  views	  to	  be	  problematic	  for	  various	  reasons13.	  Instead,	  perhaps	  Figure	  2	  should	  repre-­‐
sent	  M	  and	  P	  as	  completely	  overlapping,	  but	  this	  might	  lend	  itself	  to	  a	  reductive	  interpretation.	  The	  
most	  important	  point	  is	  that	  these	  diagrams	  (including	  Figure	  1	  and	  2)	  are	  misleading	  and,	  in	  fact,	  may	  
be	  unable	  to	  represent	  all	  distinct	  metaphysical	  views.	  It	  may	  be	  better	  not	  to	  use	  diagrams	  at	  all,	  how-­‐
ever,	  I	  will	  continue	  to	  use	  those	  such	  as	  Figure	  2	  with	  the	  caveat	  that	  we	  should	  not	  make	  metaphysical	  
inferences	  from	  these	  diagrams.	  (Note	  that	  these	  diagrams	  are	  importantly	  different	  from	  the	  causal	  
graphs	  used	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  interventionism	  and	  causal	  Bayes	  nets	  (see	  Woodward	  2011).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  One	  might	  suggest	  this	  seems	  like	  a	  naturalistic	  version	  of	  parallelism,	  but	  this	  is	  what	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  causal	  
pathway	  is	  supposed	  to	  avoid.	  Situations	  of	  parallelism	  will	  involve	  two	  entirely	  independent	  causal	  pathways,	  
which	  cause	  two	  different	  effects.	  
12	  For	  an	  alternative	  to	  a	  levels-­‐ontology	  based	  on	  levels	  in	  science,	  see	  Barnes	  (Forthcoming)	  on	  fundamentality	  
and	  see	  Schaffer	  (2009)	  on	  grounding.	  
13	  Some	  argue	  that	  the	  physical	  state’s	  set	  of	  causal	  powers	  can	  actually	  be	  identified	  with	  the	  “subset”	  of	  causal	  
powers	  these	  NRP	  identify	  as	  comprising	  the	  mental	  state.	  See	  R.	  Wilson	  (2001)	  for	  discussion.	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I	  will	  now	  provide	  a	  brief	  sketch	  of	  the	  causal	  Compatibilist	  solution,	  which	  I	  will	  describe	  in	  
more	  detail	  in	  the	  following	  subsections.	  First,	  I	  propose	  that	  the	  causal	  Compatibilist	  should	  appeal	  to	  
two	  different	  notions	  of	  causation:	  sufficiency	  and	  difference	  making.	  The	  Exclusion	  argument	  is	  nor-­‐
mally	  described	  in	  terms	  of	  causal	  sufficiency	  and	  it	  says	  nothing	  about	  causal	  difference	  making.	  By	  ap-­‐
pealing	  to	  these	  two	  notions,	  the	  causal	  Compatibilist	  can	  stake	  out	  some	  ground	  for	  mental	  causation	  
between	  overdetermination	  and	  epiphenomenalism.	  To	  do	  this,	  she	  will	  need	  to	  give	  an	  account	  of	  
overdetermination,	  mental	  causation,	  and	  epiphenomenalism	  in	  terms	  of	  both	  causal	  sufficiency	  and	  
causal	  difference	  making.	  If	  each	  case	  varies	  in	  its	  overall	  response	  to	  these	  two	  cases	  (and	  the	  causal	  
Compatibilist	  argues	  that	  it	  does),	  then	  she	  will	  have	  shown	  that	  the	  Exclusion	  principle	  is	  false.	  Recall	  
Exclusion	  states	  that	  if	  an	  effect	  has	  more	  than	  one	  distinct	  and	  sufficient	  cause,	  then	  it	  is	  overdeter-­‐
mined.	  In	  order	  to	  claim	  that	  mental	  causation	  is	  neither	  a	  case	  of	  overdetermination	  nor	  a	  case	  of	  
epiphenomenalism,	  the	  Causal	  Compatibilist	  has	  argued	  that	  mental	  causation	  involves	  two	  sufficient	  
causes,	  but	  only	  one	  difference-­‐maker.	  Overdetermination,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  involves	  two	  sufficient	  
causes	  and	  two	  difference-­‐makers.	  So,	  the	  causal	  Compatibilist	  can	  reject	  the	  Exclusion	  principle	  be-­‐
cause	  cases	  of	  mental	  causation	  involve	  more	  than	  one	  distinct	  and	  sufficient	  cause,	  but	  which	  are	  not	  
cases	  of	  overdetermination.	  However,	  much	  more	  needs	  to	  be	  said	  about	  the	  differences	  between	  
causal	  sufficiency	  and	  difference	  making	  and	  about	  the	  causal	  structure	  of	  mental	  causation	  on	  this	  ac-­‐
count.	  
2.1 Causal	  Pathways	  and	  Sufficient	  Causes	  
For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  thesis,	  a	  ‘causal	  pathway’	  is	  a	  difference-­‐maker.	  Relative	  to	  a	  given	  con-­‐
text,	  varying	  the	  occurrence	  of	  the	  event	  (a	  ‘cause’	  on	  the	  interventionist	  theory	  of	  causation)	  will	  vary	  
the	  occurrence	  of	  the	  effect.	  If	  the	  first	  event	  occurs,	  then	  the	  effect	  should	  also	  occur.	  Similarly,	  if	  the	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first	  event	  does	  not	  occur,	  then	  the	  effect	  should	  not	  occur.14	  Many	  scientific	  experiments	  test	  for	  dif-­‐
ference-­‐makers.	  	  
Larry	  Shapiro	  and	  Elliott	  Sober	  (forthcoming)	  describe	  the	  example	  of	  a	  geneticist	  who	  tests	  
whether	  phenotypes	  make	  a	  difference	  with	  respect	  to	  genetic	  inheritance	  of	  traits.	  Suppose	  a	  parent	  is	  
born	  with	  both	  genotype	  G	  and	  phenotype	  P.	  The	  parent	  has	  developed	  phenotype	  S,	  which	  is	  mutually	  
exclusive	  with	  phenotype	  P,	  due	  to	  environmental	  factors	  during	  the	  course	  of	  its	  life.	  Will	  the	  parent’s	  
offspring	  have	  phenotype	  P	  or	  S?	  Holding	  fixed	  the	  genotype	  G,	  the	  offspring	  will	  have	  phenotype	  P,	  not	  
S.	  For	  example,	  just	  because	  the	  parent,	  who	  was	  born	  rather	  scrawny,	  developed	  a	  muscle-­‐heavy	  build	  
due	  to	  labor-­‐intensive	  work,	  the	  offspring	  will	  not	  be	  born	  with	  a	  muscle-­‐heavy	  build.	  Phenotypes	  al-­‐
most	  never	  make	  a	  difference	  with	  respect	  to	  genetic	  inheritance	  of	  traits.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  altering	  
the	  genotype	  G	  to	  an	  alternative	  genotype	  H	  will	  make	  a	  difference	  to	  both	  the	  genetic	  expression	  in	  
and	  phenotype	  of	  the	  offspring.15	  
Alternatively,	  a	  ‘sufficient	  cause’	  is	  an	  event	  that	  is	  causally	  sufficient	  for	  the	  effect,	  given	  certain	  
background	  conditions.	  Some	  event’s	  being	  a	  cause	  in	  this	  sense	  only	  tells	  us	  something	  about	  the	  effect	  
when	  the	  cause	  actually	  occurs.	  For	  example,	  paying	  my	  bill	  online	  is	  sufficient	  for	  avoiding	  a	  late	  fee.	  
However,	  this	  says	  nothing	  about	  situations	  when	  I	  don’t	  pay	  my	  bill	  online.	  Perhaps	  I	  decided	  to	  pay	  my	  
bill	  by	  mail,	  which	  would	  still	  avoid	  a	  fee.	  It	  is	  often	  true	  that	  the	  number	  of	  sufficient	  causes	  is	  the	  num-­‐
ber	  of	  difference-­‐makers	  in	  any	  causal	  structure,	  but	  Compatibilists	  hold	  this	  is	  not	  always	  the	  case.	  	  
Note	  that	  nomological	  sufficiency	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  difference	  making.	  Woodward	  (2008)	  states	  
that	  nomological	  sufficiency	  “is	  a	  claim	  about	  what	  would	  happen	  if	  the	  cause	  were	  present	  but	  says	  
nothing	  about	  what	  would	  happen	  if	  the	  cause	  were	  absent	  or	  different”	  (246).	  One	  of	  the	  major	  differ-­‐
ences	  between	  these	  two	  causal	  concepts	  is	  that	  knowing	  an	  event	  is	  sufficient	  to	  produce	  an	  effect	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Difference	  making	  is	  the	  general	  idea	  behind	  the	  interventionist	  view	  of	  causation	  (see	  Woodward	  2003).	  
15	  Admittedly,	  the	  difference-­‐making	  capacities	  of	  genes	  are	  more	  complicated	  than	  I’ve	  described	  them	  here.	  For	  
discussion,	  see	  Woodward	  (2010).	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merely	  shows	  that	  the	  event	  could	  be	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  effect.	  However,	  we	  might	  insist	  that	  we	  still	  
don’t	  know	  if	  the	  event	  was	  the	  actual	  cause	  of	  the	  effect.	  	  
So	  far	  I’ve	  simply	  sketched	  an	  intuitive	  distinction	  between	  sufficiency	  and	  difference	  making.	  In	  
the	  next	  subsection,	  I	  will	  provide	  a	  more	  formal	  account	  of	  causal	  difference	  making	  by	  appealing	  to	  
Woodward’s	  interventionist	  account	  of	  causation.	  Interventionism	  will	  give	  the	  NRP	  a	  formal	  framework	  
for	  individuating	  the	  number	  of	  difference-­‐makers	  in	  a	  given	  causal	  situation.	  Doing	  so	  will	  allow	  me	  to	  
argue	  that	  the	  NRP	  can	  individuate	  causal	  cases	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  sufficient	  causes	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  differ-­‐
ence-­‐makers.	  If	  there	  are	  cases	  where	  these	  two	  concepts	  of	  causation	  individuate	  a	  different	  number	  
of	  causes,	  then	  the	  NRP	  has	  good	  reason	  to	  suppose	  that	  causal	  situations	  should	  be	  classified	  based	  on	  
the	  number	  of	  sufficient	  causes	  and	  the	  number	  of	  difference-­‐makers.	  In	  particular,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  
mental	  causation	  is	  a	  causal	  situation	  in	  which	  there	  are	  two	  sufficient	  causes	  but	  only	  one	  difference-­‐
maker.	  This	  solution	  will	  maintain	  that	  mental	  causation	  does	  not	  involve	  genuine	  overdetermination	  of	  
the	  kind	  found	  in	  firing	  squad	  cases,	  but	  also	  that	  it	  does	  not	  amount	  to	  epiphenomenalism.	  
2.2 Woodward’s	  Interventionist	  Account	  of	  Difference	  Making	  
While	  the	  intuitive	  distinction	  between	  sufficiency	  and	  difference	  making	  hints	  at	  a	  way	  to	  dis-­‐
tinguish	  between	  overdetermination,	  epiphenomenalism,	  and	  mental	  causation,	  the	  causal	  Compati-­‐
bilist	  will	  need	  to	  provide	  a	  more	  robust	  account	  of	  the	  difference	  making	  relation.	  She	  will	  need	  an	  ac-­‐
count	  that	  clearly	  individuates	  causal	  difference-­‐makers	  such	  that	  we	  can	  count	  the	  number	  of	  instances	  
in	  a	  given	  causal	  structure.	  I	  will	  appeal	  here	  to	  James	  Woodward’s	  formal	  interventionist	  account	  of	  
causation	  as	  presented	  in	  Making	  Things	  Happen	  (2003),	  which	  draws	  from	  previous	  work	  by	  Judea	  
Pearl	  (2000).	  Woodward’s	  account	  of	  difference	  making	  highlights	  the	  notion	  of	  causation	  often	  taken	  
for	  granted	  in	  scientific	  experiments	  where	  an	  independent	  variable	  is	  manipulated	  and	  its	  effects	  on	  a	  
dependent	  variable	  are	  observed	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  control	  group.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  these	  inter-­‐
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ventions	  need	  not	  actually	  be	  performed	  because	  sometimes	  we	  cannot	  actually	  manipulate	  the	  vari-­‐
able	  or	  it	  is	  unethical	  to	  manipulate	  them.	  	  
Woodward	  (2011:	  7)	  states	  that	  the	  intuitive	  notion	  of	  an	  intervention	  is	  “an	  idealized,	  uncon-­‐
founded	  experimental	  manipulation	  which	  would	  be	  appropriate	  for	  determining	  whether	  one	  variable	  
is	  causally	  related	  to	  a	  second	  variable.”	  Woodward	  (2003:	  59)	  describes	  in	  more	  detail	  the	  intervention-­‐
ist	  notion	  of	  difference	  making:	  
A	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  condition	  for	  X	  to	  be	  a	  (type-­‐level)	  direct	  cause	  [in	  the	  differ-­‐
ence	  making	  sense]	  of	  Y	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  variable	  set	  V	  is	  that	  there	  be	  a	  possible	  inter-­‐
vention	  on	  X	  that	  will	  change	  Y	  or	  the	  probability	  distribution	  of	  Y	  when	  one	  holds	  fixed	  
at	  some	  value	  all	  other	  variables	  Zi	  in	  V.	  	  
	  
The	  idea	  is	  that	  if	  X	  is	  a	  difference	  maker	  with	  respect	  to	  Y,	  then	  (holding	  fixed	  other	  variables)	  any	  
change	  in	  the	  value	  of	  Y	  will	  be	  accounted	  for	  by	  an	  earlier	  change	  in	  X.	  This	  causal	  claim	  can	  be	  tested	  
by	  representing	  the	  causal	  structure	  as	  a	  directed	  causal	  graph	  (or	  sometimes	  as	  a	  series	  of	  mathemati-­‐
cal	  equations),	  with	  ‘nodes’	  for	  each	  variable	  in	  the	  system.	  Each	  variable	  can	  be	  set	  to	  at	  least	  two	  val-­‐
ues	  (e.g.,	  occurring,	  not	  occurring).	  Interventions	  should	  be	  treated	  as	  instances	  where	  the	  arrows	  going	  
into	  some	  particular	  node	  are	  “broken”	  or	  “wiped	  out”	  (2003,	  39).	  Any	  other	  variables,	  Z,	  that	  have	  
causal	  arrows	  in	  the	  directed	  graph	  entering	  the	  variable	  Y	  will	  be	  held	  fixed	  at	  some	  particular	  value.	  
That	  is,	  the	  causal	  contribution	  of	  variables	  Z	  	  to	  Y	  are	  “controlled	  for”,	  or	  held	  constant	  while	  the	  values	  
of	  X	  are	  manipulated.	  
In	  addition	  to	  describing	  what	  interventions	  are	  in	  general,	  the	  interventionist	  will	  need	  an	  ac-­‐
count	  of	  what	  makes	  a	  causal	  graph,	  or	  causal	  diagram,	  well	  formed.	  Being	  a	  well-­‐formed	  causal	  graph	  
involves:	  (1)	  accurately	  representing	  the	  causal	  structure	  that	  is	  being	  examined	  and	  (2)	  allowing	  only	  
legitimate	  interventions.	  	  	  
(1)	  will	  require	  representing	  each	  causal	  mechanism	  separately	  and	  appropriately	  representing	  
each	  node.	  Consider	  Woodward’s	  short	  circuit	  fire	  example	  (2003,	  44-­‐5).	  Let	  the	  oxygen	  level	  Ox	  be	  1	  or	  
0	  (present,	  not	  present),	  the	  short	  circuit	  S	  be	  1	  or	  0	  (present	  or	  not	  present),	  and	  the	  fire	  F	  be	  1	  or	  0	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(present	  or	  not	  present).	  When	  Ox	  is	  set	  at	  0,	  then	  regardless	  of	  the	  value	  of	  S,	  F	  will	  be	  0.	  However,	  the	  
interventionist	  account	  only	  requires	  that	  there	  be	  some	  intervention	  on	  which	  S	  makes	  a	  difference.	  So,	  
set	  Ox	  at	  1	  and	  by	  an	  intervention	  on	  S,	  we	  will	  see	  a	  change	  in	  the	  value	  of	  F.	  However,	  the	  interaction	  
between	  the	  variables	  Ox	  and	  S	  will	  not	  be	  represented	  in	  a	  causal	  graph:	  
	  
Figure	  3.	  Short	  Circuit	  Causal	  Graph.	  Both	  S	  and	  Ox	  have	  causal	  mechanisms,	  represented	  by	  
arrows,	  by	  which	  they	  affect	  the	  occurrence	  of	  F.	  To	  correctly	  test	  for	  the	  causal	  efficacy	  of	  S,	  we	  
need	  to	  intervene	  on	  S,	  but	  only	  while	  Ox	  is	  set	  at	  1.	  The	  circle-­‐head	  arrow	  represents	  an	  inter-­‐
vention.	  
	  
Note	  that	  the	  arrows	  here	  correspond	  to	  distinct	  mechanisms.	  Although	  it	  may	  be	  natural	  to	  interpret	  
‘mechanisms’	  here	  as	  a	  physical	  causal	  process	  (e.g.,	  transmitting	  of	  a	  mark),	  it	  is	  left	  unspecified	  
whether	  these	  mechanisms	  involve	  causal	  production	  per	  se.16	  The	  interventionist	  view	  is	  non-­‐reductive	  
with	  respect	  to	  causation	  insofar	  as	  it	  does	  not	  seek	  to	  explain	  difference	  making	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  primitive	  
notion	  of	  causation	  (Woodward	  2003:	  20-­‐21).	  That	  is,	  interventionism	  does	  not	  define	  a	  difference	  mak-­‐
ing	  cause	  strictly	  in	  non-­‐causal	  terms.	  
Unfortunately,	  Woodward	  does	  not	  define	  the	  use	  of	  ‘mechanisms’	  here.	  I	  don’t	  take	  it	  to	  be	  a	  
technical	  term	  for	  interventionists,	  so	  perhaps	  we	  can	  simply	  appeal	  to	  an	  intuitive	  notion	  of	  mecha-­‐
nism.	  Often	  they	  will	  involve	  some	  physical	  process	  or	  activity	  that	  creates	  a	  change	  in	  the	  outcome	  var-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Elsewhere	  Woodward	  (2011)	  explicitly	  states	  that	  mechanisms	  should	  not	  be	  interpreted	  as	  physical	  in	  this	  
sense.	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variable.	  For	  example,	  activation	  of	  one	  brain	  area	  by	  another	  may	  be	  caused	  through	  a	  mechanism	  that	  
involves	  a	  certain	  pattern	  of	  firing	  (e.g.,	  phasic	  bursts	  above	  a	  certain	  threshold)	  by	  the	  neurons	  that	  
connect	  the	  first	  brain	  area	  to	  the	  second.	  Yet,	  we	  might	  also	  think	  that	  mechanisms	  can	  involve	  a	  lack	  
of	  activity	  as	  well.	  Perhaps	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  first	  brain	  area	  and	  the	  second	  is	  inhibitory;	  
when	  the	  neurons	  from	  the	  first	  brain	  area	  fire	  to	  the	  second	  brain	  area,	  the	  activation	  of	  the	  second	  
brain	  area	  is	  inhibited.	  Once	  the	  inhibitory	  firing	  from	  the	  first	  brain	  area	  to	  the	  second	  brain	  area	  ceas-­‐
es,	  the	  second	  brain	  area	  becomes	  activated	  again.	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  second	  brain	  area’s	  activation	  is	  
caused	  by	  the	  decreased	  firing	  rate	  of	  neurons	  coming	  from	  the	  first	  area.	  	  
Another	  aspect	  of	  judging	  when	  a	  given	  causal	  graph	  is	  well	  formed	  requires	  describing	  (2)	  when	  
interventions	  are	  legitimate.	  According	  to	  Woodward,	  it	  must	  be	  possible	  to	  intervene	  on	  one	  variable	  
and	  not	  others,	  and	  vice	  versa	  (2003:	  48,	  52).	  Another	  way	  of	  stating	  this	  requirement:	  “if	  a	  candidate	  
causal	  claim	  is	  associated	  with	  interventions	  that	  are	  impossible	  for	  (or	  lack	  any	  clear	  sense	  because	  of)	  
logical,	  conceptual	  or	  perhaps	  metaphysical	  reasons,	  then	  that	  causal	  claim	  is	  itself	  illegitimate	  or	  ill-­‐
defined”	  (2008:	  9).	  So,	  illegitimate	  interventions	  will	  generally	  involve	  confused	  causal	  claims.	  It	  is	  im-­‐
portant	  to	  get	  the	  direction	  of	  causation	  correct	  here.	  These	  causal	  claims	  are	  not	  confused	  because	  
they	  involve	  illegitimate	  interventions.	  Instead,	  considering	  illegitimate	  interventions	  should	  be	  an	  indi-­‐
cator	  that	  one’s	  causal	  claim	  is	  confused.	  For	  example,	  intervening	  on	  two	  conceptually	  identical	  claims	  
to	  test	  whether,	  e.g.,	  a	  bachelor	  or	  the	  unmarried	  man	  lives	  at	  such-­‐and-­‐such	  address	  is	  simply	  a	  con-­‐
fused	  causal	  claim.	  There	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  the	  two	  do	  not	  really	  causally	  compete.	  
For	  example,	  it	  would	  require	  an	  impossible	  intervention	  to	  hold	  the	  variable	  drinking	  H2O	  at	  0	  
while	  testing	  whether	  or	  not	  drinking	  water	  makes	  a	  difference	  to	  staying	  hydrated.	  We	  cannot	  inter-­‐
vene	  on	  drinking	  water	  in	  this	  way	  because	  it	  would	  require	  assessing	  the	  causal	  outcome	  of	  drinking	  
water	  without	  drinking	  H2O.	  The	  reason	  this	  intervention	  is	  illegitimate,	  according	  to	  Woodward,	  is	  be-­‐
cause	  the	  causal	  claim	  itself	  is	  illegitimate.	  It	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  ask	  whether	  one	  and	  the	  same	  thing	  
 17	  
makes	  a	  difference	  to	  an	  effect	  because	  this	  requires	  testing	  an	  intervention	  when	  the	  thing	  simultane-­‐
ously	  occurs	  and	  does	  not	  occur—a	  metaphysical	  impossibility.	  Note	  that	  confused	  causal	  claims	  will	  not	  
always	  involve	  confusion	  about	  identical	  objects	  with	  different	  names.	  Any	  metaphysical	  reason	  that	  
restricts	  the	  types	  of	  interventions	  that	  can	  legitimately	  be	  performed	  will	  involve	  confused	  causal	  
claims.	  Later	  in	  this	  paper	  (Section	  2.3)	  I	  will	  suggest	  that	  interventions	  that	  require	  breaking	  superven-­‐
ience	  relationships	  are	  based	  on	  illegitimate	  causal	  claims.	  
Let’s	  look	  at	  another	  (more	  complicated)	  example	  from	  Woodward	  (2003).	  Suppose	  that	  taking	  
birth	  control	  pills	  (B)	  causes	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  probability	  of	  getting	  thrombosis	  (T).	  However,	  taking	  
birth	  control	  pills	  also	  significantly	  reduces	  the	  probability	  of	  becoming	  pregnant	  (P),	  which	  itself	  cases	  
an	  increase	  in	  the	  probability	  of	  getting	  thrombosis.	  This	  causal	  structure	  can	  be	  depicted	  with	  the	  fol-­‐
lowing	  diagram	  (2003:	  50):	  
	  
Figure	  4.	  Birth	  Control	  Causal	  Graph.	  There	  are	  positive	  relationships	  between	  B	  and	  T	  and	  P	  
and	  T,	  but	  a	  negative	  relationship	  between	  B	  and	  P.	  So,	  B	  does	  not	  have	  a	  net	  effect	  on	  T.	  
	  
As	  we	  can	  see,	  there	  is	  no	  net	  effect	  of	  taking	  birth	  control	  on	  the	  probability	  of	  getting	  thrombosis.	  
However,	  we	  can	  “see”	  the	  distinct	  mechanisms,	  from	  B	  to	  T,	  and	  from	  B	  to	  P	  and	  then	  from	  P	  to	  T.	  The	  
representation	  of	  these	  mechanisms	  by	  causal	  arrows	  reflects	  causal	  mechanisms	  we	  know	  exist.	  For	  
example,	  we	  know	  that	  taking	  birth	  control	  reduces	  the	  probability	  of	  getting	  pregnant	  (under	  the	  right	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conditions,	  e.g,	  for	  women).	  We	  also	  know	  that	  getting	  pregnant	  increases	  one’s	  risk	  of	  getting	  throm-­‐
bosis.	  Finally,	  we	  know	  that	  taking	  birth	  control	  pills	  increases	  one’s	  risk	  of	  getting	  thrombosis.	  
We	  might	  wonder	  in	  what	  sense	  B	  makes	  a	  difference	  to	  T.	  Woodward	  appeals	  to	  a	  distinction	  
between	  total	  causes	  and	  contributing	  causes	  to	  explain	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  B	  is	  not	  a	  total	  cause	  of	  T,	  
but	  is	  still	  a	  contributing	  cause	  of	  T.	  A	  total	  causes	  is	  defined	  as	  follows	  (50):	  
X	  has	  a	  non-­‐null	  total	  effect	  on	  Y,	  or	  there	  is	  some	  intervention	  on	  X	  alone	  (and	  no	  other	  
variables)	  such	  that	  for	  some	  value	  of	  other	  variables	  besides	  X,	  this	  intervention	  on	  X	  
will	  change	  Y.	  
	  
In	  this	  sense	  of	  ‘cause’,	  B	  is	  not	  a	  total	  cause	  of	  T.	  There	  is	  no	  single	  intervention	  on	  B	  that	  will	  make	  a	  
difference	  to	  the	  occurrence	  of	  T.	  Intuitively,	  there	  seems	  to	  still	  be	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  B	  is	  a	  cause	  of	  T.	  
Woodward	  calls	  this	  sense	  a	  contributing	  cause	  (50):	  
X	  makes	  a	  non-­‐null	  contribution	  to	  Y	  along	  some	  directed	  path	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  for	  
those	  variables	  (if	  any)	  that	  are	  not	  on	  this	  path,	  there	  is	  some	  set	  of	  values	  of	  those	  var-­‐
iables	  such	  that	  if	  the	  variables	  were	  fixed	  by	  interventions	  at	  those	  values,	  there	  is	  
some	  intervention	  on	  X	  that	  will	  change	  the	  value	  of	  Y.	  
	  
‘Directed	  path’	  describes	  those	  pathways	  through	  the	  causal	  diagram	  with	  at	  least	  one	  variable	  between	  
X	  and	  Y	  (42).	  In	  the	  birth	  control	  case	  above,	  P’s	  being	  along	  the	  way	  from	  B	  to	  T	  makes	  it	  a	  directed	  
path.	  So,	  in	  Interventionist	  terms,	  B	  is	  not	  a	  total	  cause	  of	  T	  (as	  it	  can	  also	  be	  caused	  by	  being	  pregnant),	  
but	  B	  is	  a	  contributing	  cause	  to	  T.	  As	  the	  example	  about	  birth	  control’s	  influence	  on	  instances	  of	  throm-­‐
bosis	  shows,	  asking	  causal	  questions	  merely	  about	  total	  causes	  will	  not	  be	  sufficient	  to	  adequately	  de-­‐
scribe	  many	  causal	  structures.	  
Direct	  causes	  (but	  not	  total	  causes)	  can	  help	  distinguish	  distinctness	  of	  causal	  mechanisms.	  
Woodward	  states:	  “if	  it	  is	  really	  true	  that	  the	  mechanism	  by	  which	  B	  influences	  T	  is	  distinct	  from	  the	  
mechanism	  by	  which	  B	  and	  P	  influence	  T,	  then	  it	  should	  be	  possible	  to	  interfere	  with	  one	  of	  these	  with-­‐




Figure	  5.	  Incorrect	  Birth	  Control	  Causal	  Graph.	  This	  causal	  graph	  shows	  B	  as	  influencing	  T	  only	  along	  
one	  direct	  route.	  
	  
It	  would	  collapse	  two	  distinct	  mechanisms	  into	  one.	  Often	  we	  might	  need	  to	  perform	  particular	  inter-­‐
ventions	  to	  isolate	  different	  mechanisms.	  Woodward	  suggests	  that	  we	  look	  for	  the	  causal	  efficacy	  of	  B	  
on	  T	  by	  disrupting	  the	  inhibitory	  relationship	  between	  B	  and	  P	  on	  Figure	  4	  by	  studying	  the	  instance	  of	  
thrombosis	  in	  either	  infertile	  women	  taking	  birth	  control	  or	  in	  women	  already	  pregnant	  who	  nonethe-­‐
less	  continue	  taking	  birth	  control	  pills.	  This	  would	  involve	  fixing	  the	  value	  of	  B	  at	  1	  and	  varying	  the	  value	  
of	  P.	  
These	  formal	  interventionist	  concepts	  will	  give	  the	  Causal	  Compatibilist	  the	  tools	  to	  describe	  the	  
correct	  intervention	  in	  the	  case	  of	  mental	  causation.	  Performing	  the	  correct	  intervention	  in	  cases	  of	  
mental	  causation	  will	  allow	  the	  NRP	  to	  count	  the	  number	  of	  difference-­‐makers	  in	  those	  cases—in	  effect,	  
answering	  whether	  M,	  P,	  or	  both	  make	  a	  difference	  to	  the	  occurrence	  of	  both	  P*	  and	  M*.	  As	  we	  will	  see	  
in	  the	  following	  section,	  the	  Compatibilist	  will	  need	  to	  provide	  an	  intervention	  that	  (1)	  does	  not	  violate	  
metaphysical	  relationships.	  She	  will	  also	  need	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  causal	  graph	  (2)	  allows	  for	  interven-­‐
tions	  on	  each	  variable.	  
2.3 Performing	  the	  Correct	  Intervention	  
Many	  of	  the	  interventions	  suggested	  implicitly	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  mental	  causation	  are	  illegiti-­‐
mate	  given	  the	  interventionist	  tools	  described	  above.	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  compare	  interventions	  pro-­‐
posed	  by	  others	  with	  the	  solution	  I	  put	  forward.	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  my	  solution	  is	  does	  not	  involve	  illegiti-­‐
mate	  interventions	  and	  does	  not	  violate	  the	  NRP’s	  commitment	  to	  supervenience	  whereas	  other	  inter-­‐
ventions	  are	  illegitimate	  and	  violate	  supervenience.	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   It	  may	  be	  that	  Kim’s	  traditional	  representation	  of	  the	  exclusion	  problem	  (Figure	  1)	  has	  misled	  
many	  philosophers	  in	  their	  attempts	  to	  apply	  interventionist	  insights	  to	  the	  exclusion	  problem.	  Interven-­‐
tionism	  relies	  on	  formal	  causal	  graphs	  (adapted	  from	  Bayes	  nets)	  where	  all	  arrows	  represent	  causal	  rela-­‐
tionships.	  It	  is	  indeed	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  interventionist	  framework	  to	  evaluate	  causal	  relationships	  for	  
diagrams	  that	  include	  both	  causal	  and	  non-­‐causal	  relationships	  (Woodward	  2011).	  This	  technical	  defini-­‐
tion	  of	  causal	  graphs	  does	  not	  preclude	  extending	  the	  interventionist	  framework	  to	  accommodate	  both	  
causal	  and	  non-­‐causal	  relationships,	  but	  rather	  that	  we	  must	  be	  careful	  in	  doing	  so.	  First,	  we	  might	  think	  
that	  we	  can	  intervene	  on	  M	  directly	  to	  discover	  whether	  M	  “causally	  contributes”	  to	  P*’s	  occurrence.	  To	  
do	  this,	  we	  would	  have	  to	  sever	  the	  tie	  between	  M	  and	  P.	  Recall	  that	  performing	  an	  intervention	  on	  one	  
variable	  requires	  holding	  fixed	  all	  variables	  on	  other	  directed	  paths.	  In	  this	  case,	  we	  would	  be	  treating	  
the	  directed	  path	  from	  P	  to	  P*	  (and	  M*)	  as	  distinct	  from	  the	  directed	  path	  that	  goes	  from	  M	  to	  P*	  (and	  
M*).	  	  
	  
Figure	  6.	  Intervening	  on	  M.	  This	  figure	  comes	  from	  Woodward	  (2008).	  The	  circle-­‐head	  arrow	  
represents	  an	  intervention	  on	  M.	  The	  diamond-­‐head	  arrows	  represent	  supervenience.	  The	  arrow	  
represents	  a	  causal	  relationship.	  The	  double	  lines	  crossing	  out	  the	  supervenience	  relation	  be-­‐
tween	  P	  and	  M	  represent	  “breaking	  the	  chain”	  required	  by	  interventions.	  In	  this	  case,	  M	  is	  repre-­‐
sented	  as	  not	  occurring.	  	  
That	  is,	  we	  fix	  M	  at	  some	  particular	  value	  (perhaps:	  occurring),	  while	  allowing	  P	  to	  continue	  its	  normal	  
causal	  mechanisms,	  and	  observe	  whether	  P*	  occurs.	  Then	  we	  fix	  M	  at	  another	  value	  (not	  occurring)	  and	  
again	  observe	  whether	  P*	  occurs.	  In	  both	  cases,	  we	  would	  find	  that	  there	  was	  no	  difference	  in	  P*,	  since	  
it	  occurs	  via	  the	  causal	  mechanism	  from	  P.	  This	  might	  lead	  some	  to	  believe	  that	  M	  does	  not	  actually	  
cause	  P*	  because	  P	  is	  the	  true	  cause	  of	  P*.	  However,	  this	  intervention	  violates	  the	  supervenience	  rela-­‐
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tionship	  between	  M	  and	  P.	  There	  is	  a	  change	  in	  M	  without	  a	  change	  in	  M’s	  supervenience	  base	  P.	  The	  
main	  problem	  with	  this	  view	  is	  that	  the	  supervenience	  relation	  is	  not	  causal	  (Woodward	  2008,	  2011).	  
Correctly	  performing	  interventions	  requires	  breaking	  causal	  relations.	  As	  described	  in	  the	  previous	  sec-­‐
tion,	  I	  take	  it	  that	  those	  interventions	  that	  require	  breaking	  supervenience	  relations	  are	  illegitimate	  be-­‐
cause	  they	  require	  an	  impossible	  intervention.	  Perhaps	  the	  proponent	  of	  this	  intervention	  as	  the	  correct	  
test	  for	  the	  difference	  making	  of	  the	  mental	  would	  suggest	  that	  the	  supervenience	  relation	  is	  causal,	  but	  
this	  position	  would	  be	  contrary	  to	  Kim’s	  own	  position	  (2005,	  48).	  
One	  intervention	  described	  (but	  not	  defended)	  by	  Larry	  Shapiro	  (2010)	  is	  often	  seen	  in	  the	  lit-­‐
erature.	  Testing	  the	  difference	  making	  of	  M	  by	  holding	  M	  fixed	  while	  manipulating	  P.	  Note	  that	  the	  in-­‐
tervention	  currently	  under	  discussion	  does	  not	  violate	  the	  supervenience	  relationship	  between	  M	  and	  P.	  
If	  M	  supervenes	  on	  P,	  it	  is	  still	  possible	  to	  have	  a	  change	  in	  P	  without	  a	  change	  in	  M.	  In	  fact,	  many	  NRP	  
believe	  in	  multiple	  realizability,	  which	  is	  the	  thesis	  that	  many	  P-­‐changes	  do	  not	  result	  in	  M-­‐changes.	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  7.	  Intervening	  on	  P.	  In	  this	  picture,	  intervening	  on	  P	  requires	  “breaking	  the	  connection”	  
between	  P	  and	  M.	  
	  
However,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  this	  intervention	  is	  also	  illegitimate.	  There	  are	  two	  ways	  to	  interpret	  the	  case	  
in	  which	  M	  occurs	  but	  P	  does	  not:	  either	  M	  has	  no	  supervenience	  base	  at	  all	  or	  M	  has	  a	  supervenience	  
base	  P’,	  which	  is	  not	  identical	  to	  the	  physical	  state	  P.	  The	  former	  is	  problematic	  because	  it	  violates	  Clo-­‐
sure.	  If	  M	  occurs	  without	  P	  (or	  any	  other	  suitable	  supervenience	  base)	  and	  still	  causes	  P*	  and	  M*,	  then	  
there	  is	  a	  physical	  state	  (P*)	  with	  no	  physical	  cause.	  Crisp	  and	  Warfield	  (2001)	  argued	  for	  the	  other	  view:	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that	  M	  must	  have	  a	  supervenience	  base,	  P’,	  which	  is	  not	  identical	  to	  the	  physical	  state	  P.	  This	  strategy	  is	  
consistent	  with	  many	  NRPs’	  commitment	  to	  multiple	  realizability.	  	  	  
	   Unfortunately,	  replacing	  P	  with	  another	  supervenience	  base,	  P’,	  is	  problematic	  for	  two	  reasons.	  
First,	  it	  fails	  to	  answer	  the	  main	  question	  at	  stake	  in	  Kim’s	  version	  of	  the	  Exclusion	  Problem:	  Given	  non-­‐
reductive	  physicalism,	  do	  mental	  states	  non-­‐redundantly	  causally	  contribute	  to	  their	  effects?	  If	  we	  eval-­‐
uate	  the	  causal	  difference	  making	  of	  some	  particular	  mental	  state	  M	  without	  one	  of	  its	  possible	  super-­‐
venience	  bases	  P	  but	  allow	  another	  supervenience	  base	  P’	  to	  fill	  its	  place,	  then	  we	  haven’t	  addressed	  
Kim’s	  question.	  In	  fact,	  Kim’s	  question	  seems	  to	  arise	  again:	  Does	  M	  make	  a	  non-­‐redundant	  causal	  con-­‐
tribution	  beyond	  the	  contribution	  its	  supervenience	  base,	  P’,	  to	  their	  effects?	  To	  test	  the	  difference	  
making	  of	  M	  where	  P’	  does	  not	  occur,	  we	  again	  might	  posit	  another	  supervenience	  base	  P’’.	  However,	  
Kim’s	  question	  can	  arise	  once	  again,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  
	   The	  second	  reason	  it	  is	  problematic	  to	  replace	  P	  with	  another	  supervenience	  base	  P’	  in	  order	  to	  
evaluate	  the	  difference	  making	  of	  M	  has	  to	  do	  with	  evaluating	  counterfactuals.	  Bennett	  (2003)	  has	  ar-­‐
gued	  that	  Crisp	  and	  Warfield’s	  positing	  of	  physical	  base	  P’	  in	  supervenience	  world	  w	  changes	  the	  topic.	  
Instead,	  we	  should	  think	  of	  accessing	  these	  counterfactuals	  as	  using	  a	  “metaphysical	  hole	  puncher”	  
where	  we	  literally	  think	  of	  the	  supervenience	  base	  as	  simply	  gone	  (2003,	  15).	  The	  idea	  behind	  the	  meta-­‐
physical	  hole	  puncher	  is	  to	  rule	  out	  backtracking	  counterfactuals.17	  David	  Lewis	  has	  said	  that	  when	  we	  
imagine	  some	  event	  C	  is	  deleted,	  “we	  imagine	  that	  C	  is	  completely	  and	  cleanly	  excised	  from	  history,	  
leaving	  behind	  no	  fragment	  or	  approximation	  of	  itself”	  (2000,	  190).	  Given	  that	  both	  P	  and	  P’	  are	  appro-­‐
priate	  supervenience	  bases	  of	  M,	  I	  take	  P’	  to	  be	  an	  approximation	  of	  P.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Backtracking	  counterfactuals	  fail	  to	  hold	  fixed	  all	  other	  causes	  in	  the	  scenario.	  Say	  we	  would	  like	  to	  access	  the	  
counterfactual	  where	  one	  shooter	  (out	  of	  two)	  fails	  to	  fire	  at	  a	  victim.	  When	  we	  ask	  “does	  the	  victim	  still	  die?”,	  we	  
should	  refrain	  from	  describing	  a	  reason	  why	  one	  shooter	  fails	  to	  shoot.	  For	  example,	  it	  would	  involve	  backtracking	  
reasoning	  to	  suppose	  the	  shooter	  was	  startled	  by	  a	  dog’s	  bark	  and	  so	  did	  not	  fire.	  Following	  that	  line	  of	  reasoning,	  
we	  might	  suspect	  the	  other	  shooter	  does	  not	  fire	  either,	  so	  the	  victim	  does	  not	  die	  if	  the	  first	  shooter	  does	  not	  fire.	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Notice	  too	  that	  replacing	  P	  with	  P’	  is	  perfectly	  consistent	  with	  the	  epiphenomenalism	  of	  the	  
mental.	  It	  could	  have	  been	  P	  (or	  some	  other	  suitable	  supervenience	  base	  P’)	  doing	  the	  work	  all	  along	  
while	  M	  just	  “goes	  along	  for	  the	  ride.”	  So,	  if	  we’re	  trying	  to	  figure	  out,	  as	  Kim	  asks,	  if	  the	  mental	  actually	  
makes	  an	  additional	  causal	  contribution	  with	  respect	  to	  P*,	  then	  we	  ought	  not	  to	  evaluate	  situations	  in	  
which	  P’	  replaces	  P	  during	  an	  intervention.	  When	  we	  control	  for	  the	  influence	  of	  P,	  we	  shouldn’t	  add	  
anything	  new	  to	  the	  causal	  situation.	  Note	  that	  Kim’s	  question	  in	  the	  Exclusion	  Problem	  is	  given	  at	  the	  
type	  level	  whereas	  replacing	  P	  with	  P’	  can	  only	  address	  Kim’s	  worry	  at	  the	  token	  level.	  	  
It	  may	  seem	  intuitive	  that	  an	  intervention	  that	  requires	  holding	  fixed	  M	  while	  intervening	  on	  P	  
will	  answer	  Kim’s	  question	  about	  the	  causal	  contribution	  of	  the	  mental.	  Particularly,	  the	  intervention	  
should	  show	  whether	  or	  not	  M	  causes	  P*	  when	  P	  is	  not	  present.	  I’ve	  described	  two	  interpretations	  of	  
this	  situation:	  either	  M	  has	  another	  supervenience	  base	  on	  this	  occasion,	  P’,	  or	  it	  does	  not.	  If	  M	  does	  not	  
have	  a	  supervenience	  base	  but	  still	  causes	  P*,	  then	  Closure	  is	  violated.	  If	  M	  does	  have	  a	  supervenience	  
base	  P’	  and	  still	  causes	  P*,	  then	  I’ve	  argued	  that	  we	  have	  failed	  to	  answer	  Kim’s	  question.	  Kim	  might	  ask	  
whether	  M	  occurring	  without	  P’	  still	  causes	  P*.	  I’ve	  argued	  that	  this	  strategy	  will	  be	  repeatedly	  open	  to	  
the	  Exclusion	  Problem;	  instead	  of	  solving	  the	  problem,	  this	  strategy	  simply	  changes	  the	  question	  from	  
type-­‐level	  to	  token-­‐level.	  Given	  that	  both	  interpretations	  of	  M	  occurring	  without	  P	  are	  problematic,	  I	  
argue	  that	  we	  should	  continue	  searching	  for	  an	  appropriate	  intervention.	  
Shapiro	  suggests	  an	  alternative	  intervention.	  He	  argues	  that	  the	  correct	  test	  is	  to	  intervene	  on	  
the	  common	  cause,	  P0,	  of	  both	  M	  and	  P	  (ibid.).	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Figure	  8.	  Intervening	  on	  the	  Common	  Cause.	  This	  intervention	  involves	  breaking	  the	  causal	  
chain	  between	  P’s	  cause,	  Po,	  and	  P.	  Just	  like	  Figure	  7,	  it	  fails	  to	  break	  the	  causal	  connection	  from	  
M	  to	  P*.	  
	  
Manipulating	  P0	  will	  never	  create	  a	  case	  in	  which	  M	  occurs	  and	  P	  doesn’t,	  and	  vice	  versa.	  It	  is	  
impossible	  to	  test	  whether	  M	  makes	  a	  difference	  when	  P	  does	  not	  occur.	  Shapiro	  admits	  that	  the	  super-­‐
venience	  relationship	  cannot	  be	  broken.	  Unfortunately,	  I	  believe	  that	  Shapiro’s	  proposed	  intervention	  
still	  involves	  the	  misleading	  representation	  of	  the	  supervenience	  relation	  that	  results	  from	  Kim’s	  dia-­‐
gram	  (Figure	  1).	  Looking	  at	  Figure	  8,	  it	  is	  too	  easy	  to	  suggest	  this	  picture	  looks	  like	  overdetermination.	  	  
In	  more	  technical	  terms,	  the	  two	  causal	  arrows	  in	  this	  picture	  suggest	  that	  there	  are	  two	  causal	  
mechanisms	  at	  work.	  The	  NRP	  need	  not	  accept	  this.	  Recall	  that	  in	  Section	  1.3	  I	  suggested	  the	  NRP	  should	  
reject	  any	  principle	  that	  relies	  on	  a	  production	  view	  of	  causation	  or	  the	  entailment	  of	  positing	  emergent	  
causal	  properties	  given	  one	  rejects	  the	  causal	  inheritance	  principle.	  To	  suppose	  that	  the	  NRP	  must	  posit	  
a	  separate	  causal	  mechanism	  (i.e.,	  that	  the	  mental	  must	  do	  “extra	  causal	  work”	  compared	  to	  the	  physi-­‐
cal)	  is	  to	  rule	  out	  many	  NRP	  views.	  If	  the	  Exclusion	  Argument	  relies	  on	  these	  views,	  then	  it	  begs	  the	  
question	  against	  many	  NRPs.	  	  
Further,	  the	  causal	  diagram	  proposed	  by	  Shapiro’s	  contains	  nodes	  that	  cannot	  be	  intervened	  
upon,	  which	  violates	  the	  principle	  of	  impossible	  interventions.	  While	  he	  admits	  it	  is	  metaphysically	  im-­‐
possible	  to	  intervene	  on	  M	  or	  P	  independently	  (since	  this	  amounts	  to	  breaking	  the	  supervenience	  rela-­‐
tionship),	  his	  causal	  diagram	  has	  two	  variables	  that	  cannot	  be	  intervened	  upon	  individually.	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I	  argue	  that	  the	  correct	  intervention	  should	  treat	  M&P	  as	  a	  variable	  together.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  M	  
and	  P	  are	  difference-­‐makers	  only	  when	  they	  occur	  together.	  There	  should	  only	  be	  one	  causal	  mecha-­‐
nism	  between	  M&P	  and	  M*&P*.	  Although	  it	  may	  seem	  like	  I’ve	  denied	  Distinctness,	  I	  will	  argue	  against	  
this	  claim	  in	  section	  3.1.	  For	  now,	  consider	  the	  following	  diagram:	  
	  
Figure	  9.	  Intervening	  on	  M&P.	  Here	  we	  intervene	  on	  M&P	  by	  varying	  their	  value	  together.	  
There	  is	  only	  one	  “causal	  mechanism”	  from	  M&P	  to	  M*&P*.	  M&P	  will	  count	  as	  a	  difference-­‐
maker	  with	  respect	  to	  M*&P*.	  
	  
We	  can	  intervene	  on	  M&P	  by	  holding	  it	  fixed	  at	  occurring,	  which	  will	  result	  in	  M*’s	  and	  P*’s	  oc-­‐
curring.	  We	  can	  then	  hold	  M&P	  fixed	  at	  not	  occurring,	  which	  will	  result	  in	  P*’s	  not	  occurring	  (excluding	  
cases	  where	  there	  is	  another	  suitable	  subvenient	  base	  P’).	  Further,	  this	  intervention	  does	  not	  require	  
breaking	  the	  supervenience	  relationship.	  This	  means	  it	  does	  not	  require	  the	  strange	  move	  of	  treating	  
supervenience	  as	  causal.	  While	  there	  may	  be	  ways	  to	  amend	  the	  interventionist	  framework	  to	  evaluate	  
causal	  diagrams	  that	  include	  both	  causal	  and	  non-­‐causal	  relationships,	  it	  will	  be	  more	  straightforward	  
(and	  we	  will	  make	  less	  errors)	  when	  variables	  can	  be	  independently	  set	  to	  any	  combination	  of	  values	  
(Woodward	  2011,	  25).	  Although	  Woodward	  has	  not	  described	  in	  detail	  the	  correct	  intervention,	  I	  take	  it	  
that	  my	  account	  here	  would	  be	  consistent	  with	  what	  he	  has	  in	  mind.	  He	  says	  (2011:	  26):	  “I	  suggest	  that	  
an	  intervention	  on	  a	  variable	  X	  also	  should	  be	  treated	  as	  automatically	  changing	  (indeed	  as	  also	  an	  in-­‐
tervention	  on)	  the	  supervenience	  base	  SB(X)	  of	  X,	  with	  SB(X)	  changing	  in	  whatever	  way	  is	  required	  by	  
the	  supervenience	  relation	  between	  X	  and	  SB	  (X)”.	  The	  “automatic	  changing”	  Woodward	  describes	  is	  
built	  into	  the	  intervention	  I’ve	  just	  described	  and	  although	  it	  may	  not	  be	  the	  only	  interpretation	  of	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Woodward’s	  quote,	  unlike	  the	  interventions	  describe	  earlier	  in	  this	  section,	  there	  is	  no	  room	  for	  mistak-­‐
ing	  the	  supervenience	  relationship	  for	  a	  causal	  one.	  
The	  causal	  arrow	  from	  M&P	  to	  M*&P*	  represents	  only	  one	  distinct	  mechanism.	  I	  take	  this	  met-­‐
aphysical	  fact	  to	  be	  grounded	  in	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  causal	  inheritance	  principle	  and	  the	  rejection	  of	  
CAM	  from	  section	  1.2.	  Given	  the	  tight	  connection	  between	  the	  mental	  and	  the	  physical	  for	  NRP,	  it	  is	  un-­‐
surprising	  that	  the	  two	  cause	  their	  effects	  through	  the	  same	  physical	  mechanism.	  However,	  we	  cannot	  
simply	  “read”	  the	  number	  of	  distinct	  mechanisms	  off	  the	  causal	  graph.	  In	  fact,	  if	  we	  try	  to	  adapt	  Kim’s	  
Figure	  2	  into	  the	  interventionist	  framework,	  Woodward	  (2011)	  suggests	  that	  it	  may	  in	  fact	  be	  correct	  to	  
draw	  only	  the	  causal	  arrow	  from	  P	  to	  P*,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  M	  also	  causes	  M*	  through	  the	  same	  
mechanism.	  As	  these	  representations	  can	  often	  mislead	  us	  in	  cases	  that	  involve	  both	  causal	  and	  non-­‐
causal	  relationships,	  I	  take	  it	  as	  a	  virtue	  that	  my	  account	  does	  not	  invoke	  these	  counterintuitive	  dia-­‐
grams.	  
Perhaps	  one	  might	  suggest	  that	  lumping	  M&P	  together	  is	  illegitimate,	  not	  because	  there	  is	  an	  
impossible	  intervention,	  but	  because	  M	  and	  P	  work	  through	  distinct	  mechanisms.	  However,	  this	  is	  sim-­‐
ply	  not	  the	  case.	  On	  our	  diagram,	  M&P	  do	  not	  work	  through	  distinct	  mechanisms—a	  consequence	  of	  
accepting	  the	  principle	  of	  impossible	  interventions.	  Perhaps	  the	  objector	  would	  suggest	  that	  M	  and	  P	  
should	  work	  through	  different	  mechanisms.	  It	  is	  unclear	  that	  the	  NRP	  is	  actually	  committed	  to	  the	  exis-­‐
tence	  of	  different	  mechanisms	  here.	  Even	  Kim	  suggests	  that	  mental	  causation	  can’t	  be	  explained	  by	  
analogy	  to	  multiple	  mechanisms	  (like	  in	  the	  case	  of	  firing	  squads)	  because	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  make	  sense	  
of	  an	  independent	  mental	  mechanism.	  He	  says:	  “it	  makes	  no	  sense	  to	  think	  that	  there	  might	  be	  an	  inde-­‐
pendent,	  perhaps	  telekinetic,	  causal	  path	  from	  the	  pain	  to	  the	  limb	  movement”	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  neural	  
pathway	  (1989,	  281).	  	  
One	  might	  suggest	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘illegitimacy’	  used	  throughout	  this	  section	  fails	  to	  signify	  a	  
deep	  metaphysical	  problem	  with	  these	  other	  proposed	  interventions.	  Perhaps	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  of	  the	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proposed	  interventions	  have	  been	  labeled	  as	  ‘illegitimate’	  shows	  that	  the	  interventionist	  framework	  
simply	  isn’t	  very	  good	  at	  representing	  non-­‐causal	  dependency	  relationships.	  However,	  the	  intervention-­‐
ist	  framework	  I’ve	  presented	  adequately	  reflects	  the	  causal	  relationships	  (which	  it	  is	  meant	  to	  do)	  and	  
does	  not	  require	  reworking	  the	  causal	  graphs	  to	  include	  non-­‐causal	  dependency	  relationships.	  Further,	  
it	  rests	  not	  merely	  on	  arbitrary	  rules	  for	  causal	  modeling,	  but	  on	  metaphysical	  principles.	  Impossible	  in-­‐
terventions	  (e.g.,	  breaking	  supervenience	  relationships)	  should	  not	  be	  allowed	  because	  they	  involve	  
evaluating	  problematic	  counterfactuals.	  By	  requiring	  interventions	  that	  holding	  fixed	  the	  subvenient	  
base	  and	  manipulate	  the	  supervenient	  property,	  we	  would	  be	  assessing	  counterfactuals	  with	  false	  (and	  
metaphysically	  impossible)	  antecedents.	  It	  seems	  likely	  that	  these	  counterfactuals	  are	  simply	  the	  wrong	  
ones	  to	  evaluate	  when	  we’re	  asking	  questions	  about	  the	  causal	  efficacy	  of	  properties	  in	  a	  supervenience	  
relationship.	  	  
Here	  is	  an	  example	  that	  comes	  from	  Woodward	  (2011).	  Consider	  a	  scientist	  interested	  in	  the	  ef-­‐
ficacy	  of	  a	  new	  drug	  in	  treating	  some	  condition.	  Suppose	  she	  comes	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  macroscopic	  
properties	  of	  the	  drug	  supervene	  on	  the	  chemical	  properties	  of	  the	  drug.	  She	  would	  not	  then	  attempt	  to	  
formulate	  an	  experiment	  by	  which	  she	  could	  hold	  fixed	  the	  chemical	  composition	  of	  the	  drug	  while	  vary-­‐
ing	  the	  macroscopic	  properties	  of	  the	  drug—this	  is	  impossible.	  In	  fact,	  it	  doesn’t	  even	  seem	  to	  be	  rele-­‐
vant	  to	  the	  types	  of	  questions	  the	  scientist	  is	  interested	  in,	  e.g.,	  will	  this	  drug	  be	  equally	  efficacious	  in	  an	  
older	  population?	  The	  point	  is	  that	  we	  do	  not	  think	  supervenience	  (or	  at	  least,	  non-­‐causal	  dependency)	  
relationships	  need	  to	  be	  controlled	  for	  when	  testing	  for	  causal	  efficacy.	  More	  formally,	  we	  should	  not	  
treat	  members	  of	  a	  supervenience	  relationship	  as	  being	  off	  the	  directed	  path	  that	  we	  are	  evaluating.	  If	  
we	  are	  interested	  in	  the	  difference	  making	  of	  M	  with	  respect	  to	  P*,	  then	  we	  should	  not	  treat	  P	  as	  an	  off-­‐
path	  variable	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  controlled	  for.	  Similarly,	  if	  we	  are	  evaluating	  the	  difference	  making	  of	  P	  
with	  respect	  to	  P*,	  then	  we	  should	  not	  treat	  M	  as	  an	  off-­‐path	  variable.	  It	  is	  Kim’s	  insistence	  that	  we	  con-­‐
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trol	  for	  the	  causal	  contribution	  of	  M’s	  supervenience	  base	  when	  evaluating	  M’s	  causal	  efficacy	  that	  mis-­‐
leads	  much	  of	  the	  discussion	  about	  the	  correct	  intervention.	  	  
In	  Sections	  2.1,	  2.2,	  and	  the	  current	  section,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  our	  causal	  notions	  of	  sufficiency	  
and	  difference	  making	  come	  apart	  in	  cases	  of	  mental	  causation,	  but	  not	  in	  cases	  of	  overdetermination.	  
Since	  M	  and	  P	  are	  both	  distinct	  and	  sufficient	  causes	  of	  P*,	  each	  counts	  as	  a	  sufficient	  cause	  and	  the	  
NRP	  avoids	  epiphenomenalism.	  However,	  M	  and	  P	  are	  closely	  related	  such	  that	  we	  cannot	  intervene	  on	  
one	  without	  intervening	  on	  the	  other.	  Interventions	  that	  require	  breaking	  the	  supervenience	  relation-­‐
ship	  between	  M	  and	  P	  are	  illegitimate.	  Particularly,	  I	  addressed	  the	  strategy	  of	  appealing	  to	  multiple	  re-­‐
alizability	  in	  order	  to	  replace	  P	  with	  another	  supervenience	  base	  P’	  during	  interventions	  on	  P.	  I’ve	  ar-­‐
gued	  that	  it	  allows	  the	  Exclusion	  Problem	  to	  arise	  again	  concerning	  the	  causal	  contributions	  of	  M	  and	  P’	  
and	  that	  correctly	  evaluating	  counterfactuals	  might	  require	  us	  to	  imagine	  even	  approximations	  of	  the	  
physical	  state	  P	  (which	  includes	  P’)	  to	  be	  deleted	  during	  the	  intervention.	  Given	  the	  failure	  of	  these	  oth-­‐
er	  interventions,	  I	  proposed	  that	  M	  and	  P	  only	  count	  as	  a	  difference-­‐maker,	  with	  respect	  to	  P*	  and	  M*,	  
together.	  I	  take	  this	  line	  to	  be	  consistent	  with	  Woodward’s	  (2011)	  idea	  that	  when	  evaluating	  the	  
difference	  making	  of	  a	  supervening	  property,	  we	  should	  not	  control	  for	  the	  supervenience	  base.	  Ulti-­‐
mately,	  I’ve	  argued	  that	  mental	  causation	  involves	  two	  sufficient	  causes	  but	  only	  one	  difference-­‐maker.	  	  
In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  will	  explain	  how	  the	  Causal	  Compatibilist’s	  appeal	  to	  causal	  sufficiency	  and	  
difference	  making	  can	  solve	  the	  Exclusion	  Problem.	  Given	  the	  definition	  of	  overdetermination	  provided	  
above,	  the	  NRP	  avoids	  the	  Overdetermination	  Horn.	  That	  is,	  genuine	  overdetermination	  (as	  in	  the	  case	  
of	  firing	  squads)	  involves	  two	  sufficient	  causes	  and	  two	  difference-­‐makers.	  She	  also	  avoids	  the	  Epiphe-­‐
nomenalism	  Horn	  given	  that	  M	  is	  still	  a	  sufficient	  cause	  of	  P*.	  Epiphenomenalism	  involves	  only	  one	  suf-­‐
ficient	  cause	  and	  one	  difference-­‐maker	  whereas	  I’ve	  argued	  that	  mental	  causation	  involves	  two	  suffi-­‐
cient	  causes	  and	  one	  difference-­‐maker.	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3 USING	  INTERVENTIONISM	  TO	  SOLVE	  THE	  EXCLUSION	  PROBLEM	  
In	  the	  last	  section,	  I	  argued	  that	  the	  mental	  and	  the	  physical	  only	  count	  as	  a	  difference-­‐maker	  
together.	  I	  explicated	  this	  slogan	  by	  using	  Woodward’s	  formal	  account	  of	  causal	  interventions—
appealing	  to	  the	  requirement	  to	  avoid	  impossible	  interventions.	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  defend	  the	  particular	  
type	  of	  intervention	  I	  proposed	  and	  compared	  it	  to	  other	  previous	  suggested	  interventions.	  In	  this	  sec-­‐
tion,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  mental	  and	  the	  physical	  causes	  are	  both	  distinct	  and	  sufficient,	  despite	  the	  fact	  
that	  they	  only	  make	  a	  difference	  together.	  I	  will	  also	  discuss	  overdetermination	  in	  light	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  
causal	  difference	  making.	  Finally,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  NRP	  should	  reject	  the	  Exclusion	  principle	  to	  get	  
out	  of	  Kim’s	  Exclusion	  Argument.	  
3.1 Distinct	  and	  Sufficient	  Causes	  
Recall	  that	  the	  Causal	  Compatibilist’s	  goal	  is	  to	  show	  that	  mental	  causation	  is	  not	  a	  case	  of	  either	  
overdetermination	  or	  epiphenomenalism.	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  aim	  to	  address	  the	  objection	  that	  the	  Causal	  
Compatibilist	  solution	  described	  above	  denies	  Distinctness.	  	  
A	  defender	  of	  Kim’s	  Exclusion	  Problem	  might	  suggest	  that	  my	  solution	  relies	  on	  treating	  the	  
mental	  and	  the	  physical	  as	  non-­‐distinct,	  at	  least	  on	  the	  interventionist	  account	  of	  causation.	  With	  re-­‐
spect	  to	  difference	  making,	  it	  is	  not	  just	  that	  the	  mental	  and	  the	  physical	  work	  through	  one	  mechanism,	  
but	  rather	  that	  the	  mental	  and	  the	  physical	  are	  also	  treated	  as	  a	  single	  variable.	  Perhaps	  the	  Causal	  
Compatibilist	  can	  appeal	  to	  causal	  sufficiency	  here,	  but	  it	  seems	  there	  are	  cases	  where	  two	  sufficient	  
causes	  for	  an	  effect	  are	  actually	  the	  same	  object	  or	  person.	  For	  example,	  Cicero’s	  giving	  of	  the	  Catiline	  
Orations	  and	  Tully’s	  giving	  of	  the	  Catiline	  Orations	  are	  both	  sufficient	  causes	  of	  Catiline	  leaving	  Rome.	  
However,	  Cicero	  and	  Tully	  are	  actually	  the	  same	  person,	  so	  Cicero’s	  and	  Tully’s	  respective	  giving	  of	  the	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Catiline	  Orations	  appear	  not	  to	  be	  distinct	  sufficient	  causes.18	  Appealing	  to	  the	  sufficiency	  of	  the	  mental	  
and	  the	  physical	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  establish	  that	  the	  two	  are	  actually	  distinct.	  
	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  Causal	  Compatibilist	  has	  an	  adequate	  reply	  to	  this	  worry.	  First,	  although	  the	  in-­‐
terventionist	  framework	  requires	  that	  there	  is	  only	  one	  causal	  mechanism	  that	  generates	  M*&P*	  repre-­‐
sented	  in	  the	  causal	  graph,	  there	  is	  no	  ontological	  commitment	  behind	  describing	  a	  variable	  as	  contain-­‐
ing	  both	  M&P.	  For	  example,	  variables	  on	  the	  interventionist	  picture	  can	  lump	  together	  ontologically	  dis-­‐
tinct	  things	  (e.g.,	  determinates	  and	  determinables).	  	  
Consider	  an	  example	  of	  treating	  ‘red’	  as	  a	  variable.	  Usually,	  scarlet	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  deter-­‐
minate	  of	  the	  determinable	  red.	  Any	  particular	  instance	  of	  red	  will	  be	  a	  type	  of	  red,	  e.g.,	  scarlet.	  Sup-­‐
pose	  that	  a	  pigeon	  has	  been	  trained	  to	  peck	  when	  presented	  with	  some	  particular	  colored	  stimulus.	  A	  
lab	  assistant	  observes	  the	  pigeon	  peck	  after	  the	  presentation	  of	  a	  scarlet	  stimulus.	  Unbeknownst	  to	  the	  
lab	  assistant,	  the	  pigeon	  has	  been	  trained	  to	  peck	  after	  perceiving	  any	  shade	  of	  red.	  Consider	  the	  follow-­‐
ing	  two	  causal	  situations:	  
(1) Scarlet	  stimuli	  cause	  the	  pigeon	  to	  peck	  the	  target.	  
(2) Red	  stimuli	  cause	  the	  pigeon	  to	  peck	  the	  target.	  
Clearly,	  we	  know	  that	  (1)	  is	  true.	  (2)	  is	  also	  true.	  However,	  asserting	  (1)	  is	  overspecified	  in	  an	  
important	  way.	  It	  might	  lead	  the	  lab	  assistant	  to	  ask	  whether	  the	  pigeon	  will	  also	  peck	  after	  the	  pres-­‐
ence	  of	  non-­‐scarlet	  but	  red	  (e.g.,	  orange-­‐red)	  stimuli.	  The	  point	  here	  is	  that	  the	  scarlet	  object	  is	  also	  red,	  
and	  in	  this	  particular	  case,	  both	  make	  a	  difference	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  pigeon	  pecks	  the	  target.	  Al-­‐
though	  red	  and	  scarlet	  are	  lumped	  together	  under	  the	  same	  variable	  on	  the	  interventionist	  picture,	  they	  
are	  still	  distinct.	  Red	  and	  orange-­‐red	  can	  also	  elicit	  the	  stimulus	  under	  a	  different	  intervention.	  It	  is	  only	  
after	  multiple	  interventions	  on	  different	  stimuli	  that	  we	  can	  distinguish	  (1)	  from	  (2).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  I	  am	  indebted	  to	  Blake	  Nespica	  for	  pressing	  this	  objection.	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Here	  the	  NRP	  can	  also	  appeal	  to	  multiple	  realizability.19	  Many	  NRPs	  believe	  that	  mental	  states	  
are	  multiply	  realized	  by	  a	  range	  of	  neural	  states.	  For	  example,	  the	  mental	  state	  M	  may	  be	  realized	  by	  P	  
or	  P’.	  Although	  I’ve	  argued	  in	  section	  2.3	  that	  an	  appeal	  to	  multiple	  realizability	  cannot	  justify	  replacing	  
P	  with	  P’	  when	  evaluating	  the	  causal	  efficacy	  of	  M	  when	  P	  does	  not	  occur,	  the	  Causal	  Compatibilist	  can	  
still	  appeal	  to	  multiple	  realizability	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  the	  distinctness	  of	  the	  mental	  and	  the	  physical.	  
When	  evaluating	  the	  difference	  making	  of	  the	  mental	  and	  the	  physical,	  I’ve	  argued	  that	  the	  two	  should	  
be	  treated	  as	  one	  variable.	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  violate	  Distinctness.	  Given	  multiple	  realizability,	  M	  
may	  occur	  when	  P	  does	  not	  occur—namely	  when	  some	  other	  suitable	  supervenience	  base	  P’	  is	  present.	  
For	  the	  reasons	  presented	  in	  section	  2.3,	  this	  fact	  should	  not	  be	  used	  to	  evaluate	  the	  difference	  making	  
of	  M.	  However,	  the	  fact	  that	  M	  can	  occur	  without	  P	  can	  be	  used	  to	  show	  that	  these	  states	  are	  still	  nu-­‐
merically	  (and	  even	  modally)	  distinct.	  	  
In	  this	  section	  I	  have	  addressed	  a	  concern	  that	  in	  making	  room	  for	  the	  Causal	  Compatibilist	  solu-­‐
tion	  by	  arguing	  No	  Overdetermination	  and	  Efficacy	  are	  consistent,	  I	  may	  have	  denied	  Distinctness.	  I	  have	  
tried	  to	  show	  that	  treating	  the	  mental	  and	  the	  physical	  as	  one	  variable	  while	  assessing	  the	  number	  of	  
difference-­‐makers	  does	  not	  entail	  that	  the	  mental	  and	  the	  physical	  are	  non-­‐distinct.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  
will	  analyze	  overdetermination	  more	  closely.	  I	  will	  then	  argue	  that	  the	  Causal	  Compatibilist	  can	  distin-­‐
guish	  between	  cases	  of	  overdetermination	  and	  mental	  causation	  by	  the	  number	  of	  causal	  pathways.	  
3.2 Overdetermination	  and	  Difference	  Making	  
The	  Causal	  Compatibilist	  is	  more	  often	  accused	  of	  committing	  herself	  to	  widespread	  overdeter-­‐
mination	  than	  epiphenomenalism.	  Now	  that	  I’ve	  described	  how	  the	  Causal	  Compatibilist	  can	  describe	  
the	  causal	  structure	  of	  mental	  causation	  in	  respect	  to	  both	  causal	  sufficiency	  and	  causal	  difference	  mak-­‐
ing,	  it	  will	  be	  important	  for	  her	  to	  distinguish	  cases	  of	  mental	  causation	  from	  overdetermination.	  Here	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  The	  thesis	  of	  multiple	  realizability	  is	  controversial,	  but	  evaluating	  it	  is	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper.	  For	  an	  
overview	  (including	  some	  objections),	  see	  Bickle	  (2013).	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she	  will	  need	  to	  evaluate	  overdetermination	  in	  terms	  of	  difference	  making	  so	  that	  she	  can	  individuate	  
the	  causal	  pathways	  involved.	  I	  argue	  that	  cases	  of	  genuine	  overdetermination	  involve	  two	  causal	  path-­‐
ways	  whereas	  mental	  causation,	  as	  I’ve	  argued	  above,	  involves	  only	  one.	  Ultimately,	  this	  distinction	  will	  
cast	  doubt	  on	  the	  Exclusion	  principle	  itself,	  which	  specifies	  causal	  structures	  according	  to	  only	  sufficient	  
causes.	  
As	  it	  happens,	  the	  current	  literature	  is	  divided	  on	  the	  precise	  definition	  of	  overdetermination.	  
Often	  it	  is	  unclear	  what	  overdetermination	  actually	  involves.20	  Sometimes	  overdetermination	  is	  de-­‐
scribed	  simply	  with	  an	  analogy	  to	  firing	  squads.	  When	  overdetermination	  is	  more	  formally	  defined,	  it	  is	  
merely	  defined	  as	  cases	  when	  an	  effect	  has	  more	  than	  one	  sufficient	  cause.	  21	  	  
Firing	  squads	  are	  a	  paradigmatic	  example	  of	  overdetermination,	  so	  they	  are	  a	  natural	  place	  to	  
start	  examining	  the	  causal	  structure	  of	  genuine	  overdetermination.	  Take	  two	  members	  of	  a	  firing	  squad,	  
Alice	  and	  Bill,	  who	  both	  simultaneously	  shoot	  their	  victim,	  Christine.	  Assume	  that	  both	  shots	  hit	  Chris-­‐
tine’s	  heart	  at	  the	  same	  time	  and	  that	  both	  Alice’s	  and	  Bill’s	  acts	  of	  firing	  their	  guns	  are	  individually	  suf-­‐
ficient	  to	  cause	  Christine’s	  death.	  Given	  the	  accepted	  definition	  of	  overdetermination,	  it	  appears	  that	  
firing	  squad	  cases	  like	  this	  are	  actual	  instances	  of	  overdetermination.	  Overdetermination	  is	  typically	  de-­‐
picted	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  causation	  literature	  with	  the	  following	  diagram:	  
	  
Figure	  10.	  Firing	  Squad	  Overdetermination.	  The	  nodes	  each	  represent	  some	  event	  such	  as	  Al-­‐
ice’s	  firing	  her	  gun.	  Each	  arrow	  represents	  causal	  mechanism	  from	  the	  first	  node	  to	  the	  second.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  See	  Paul	  2010,	  p.	  473.	  
21	  Menzies	  (2008)	  notes	  that	  the	  Exclusion	  principle	  is	  often	  phrased	  in	  terms	  of	  causal	  sufficiency.	  It	  may	  be	  that	  
the	  almost	  exclusive	  focus	  on	  causal	  sufficiency	  in	  discussion	  of	  the	  Exclusion	  Problem	  is	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  focus	  
on	  laws	  of	  nature	  and	  the	  Deductive-­‐Nomological	  model	  of	  explanation	  (See	  Woodward	  2008).	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Kim	  believes	  that	  whatever	  causal	  structure	  best	  represents	  the	  mental	  causation	  cases,	  it	  is	  not	  
on	  par	  with	  firing	  squad	  cases	  (1989,	  281;	  1998,	  53).	  Kim	  offers	  a	  few	  unsatisfactory	  explanations	  for	  the	  
disanalogy.22	  It	  is	  important	  that	  firing	  squads	  and	  mental	  causation	  are	  relevantly	  disanalogous	  because	  
if	  they	  were	  not,	  mental	  causation	  would	  involve	  genuine	  overdetermination.	  One	  might	  hold	  that	  the	  
type	  of	  overdetermination	  involved	  in	  mental	  causation	  and	  the	  type	  involved	  in	  firing	  squads	  are	  
disanalogous,	  but	  that	  mental	  causation	  still	  involves	  overdetermination,	  at	  least	  of	  a	  less	  pernicious	  
sort.	  However,	  it	  is	  less	  clear	  that	  this	  sort	  of	  move	  is	  a	  reply	  for	  Kim.	  Say	  we	  replaced	  the	  instances	  of	  
‘genuine	  overdetermination’	  in	  the	  Exclusion	  Problem	  with	  ‘pernicious	  overdetermination’	  and	  ‘harm-­‐
less	  overdetermination.’	  Firing	  squads	  would	  fall	  under	  the	  former	  label	  while	  mental	  causation	  would	  
fall	  under	  the	  latter.	  No	  Overdetermination	  would	  simply	  state	  that	  mental	  causation,	  as	  a	  case	  of	  harm-­‐
less	  overdetermination,	  is	  not	  analogous	  to	  firing	  squads,	  as	  cases	  of	  pernicious	  overdetermination.	  For	  
Kim	  to	  use	  this	  distinction	  in	  overdetermination	  to	  argue	  that	  mental	  causes	  should	  be	  excluded,	  the	  
Exclusion	  principle	  would	  need	  to	  state:	  if	  an	  event	  has	  more	  than	  one	  distinct	  and	  sufficient	  cause,	  then	  
it	  is	  (at	  least)	  harmlessly	  overdetermined.	  It	  then	  becomes	  unclear	  why	  being	  harmlessly	  overdeter-­‐
mined	  is	  a	  problem;	  at	  least	  the	  mental	  causation	  case	  does	  not	  involve	  the	  pernicious	  sort	  of	  overde-­‐
termination	  found	  in	  firing	  squad	  cases.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  the	  Exclusion	  principle	  appealed	  to	  perni-­‐
cious	  overdetermination,	  the	  Causal	  Compatibilist	  would	  simply	  reject	  it	  as	  false.	  Mental	  causation	  is	  
disanalogous	  to	  firing	  squad	  cases,	  but	  it	  still	  involves	  more	  than	  one	  distinct	  and	  sufficient	  cause.	  Either	  
way,	  it	  seems	  that	  this	  line	  on	  overdetermination	  does	  not	  threaten	  the	  Causal	  Compatibilist	  arguments	  
described	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	  Perhaps	  a	  Causal	  Compatibilist	  can	  simply	  refer	  to	  mental	  causation	  as	  
involving	  a	  harmless	  kind	  of	  overdetermination,	  but	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  thesis,	  I	  will	  continue	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Kim	  mentions	  that	  if	  firing	  squads	  and	  mental	  causation	  were	  analogous,	  then	  overdetermination	  would	  be	  
“widespread”	  (1998,	  44-­‐5).	  The	  frequency	  of	  some	  potentially	  problematic	  event	  is	  irrelevant	  to	  what	  is	  problem-­‐
atic	  about	  the	  event.	  Kim	  also	  considers	  the	  argument	  that	  if	  firing	  squads	  and	  mental	  causation	  were	  analogous,	  
then	  Closure	  would	  fail	  in	  a	  near-­‐by	  possible	  world	  where	  the	  physical	  cause	  does	  not	  occur	  and	  the	  effect	  is	  
caused	  by	  the	  mental	  cause	  alone	  (ibid.).	  Fully	  responding	  to	  this	  argument	  is	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper,	  but	  
see	  both	  Crisp	  and	  Warfield	  (2001)	  and	  Bennett	  (2003)	  for	  responses.	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consider	  firing	  squad	  cases	  as	  cases	  of	  genuine	  overdetermination	  whereas	  cases	  of	  mental	  causation	  
will	  not	  involve	  overdetermination.	  	  
Consider	  the	  symmetric	  firing	  squad	  case	  described	  above	  in	  terms	  of	  both	  causal	  sufficiency	  
and	  difference	  making.	  Each	  shooter	  counts	  as	  a	  sufficient	  cause	  of	  Christine’s	  death	  because	  each	  act	  of	  
shooting	  is	  causally	  sufficient	  for	  the	  occurrence	  of	  her	  death.	  What	  about	  with	  respect	  to	  difference	  
making?	  At	  first,	  it	  seems	  like	  neither	  shooting-­‐events	  are	  difference-­‐makers	  to	  the	  event	  of	  the	  Chris-­‐
tine’s	  death.	  However,	  some	  casual	  structures	  require	  making	  use	  of	  multiple	  interventions	  (Woodward	  
2003,	  52).	  When	  we	  hold	  fixed	  Bill’s	  shooting	  as	  it	  happens,	  then	  Alice’s	  shooting	  appears	  not	  to	  make	  a	  
difference	  to	  Christine’s	  death.	  However,	  when	  we	  suppose	  Bill	  did	  not	  shoot	  and	  then	  vary	  whether	  or	  
not	  Alice	  shoots,	  her	  shooting	  does	  make	  a	  difference	  to	  Christine’s	  death.	  So,	  the	  question	  is	  not	  
whether	  Alice’s	  shooting	  rather	  than	  Bill’s	  shooting	  is	  the	  cause	  of	  Christine’s	  death.23	  Instead,	  we	  
should	  ask	  whether	  Alice’s	  shooting	  rather	  than	  Alice’s	  not	  shooting	  when	  Bill	  does	  not	  shoot	  is	  the	  
cause	  of	  Christine’s	  death.24	  In	  this	  case,	  Alice’s	  and	  Bill’s	  shootings	  will	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  both	  sufficient	  
causes	  and	  difference-­‐makers.	  Note	  also	  that	  the	  variables	  representing	  Alice’s	  and	  Bill’s	  shooting	  their	  
guns	  can	  be	  manipulated	  independently	  in	  contrast	  to	  cases	  of	  variables	  in	  a	  supervenience	  (or	  other	  
dependence	  relationship).	  
Given	  the	  implications	  of	  Kim’s	  claims	  about	  firing	  squad	  cases,	  Compatibilists	  should	  define	  
genuine	  overdetermination	  as	  involving	  both	  two	  sufficient	  causes	  and	  two	  causal	  pathways.	  Often	  
overdetermination,	  if	  it	  is	  defined	  at	  all,	  is	  merely	  described	  as	  involving	  more	  than	  one	  sufficient	  cause.	  
Instead,	  I	  propose	  a	  working	  definition	  of	  overdetermination25:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Here	  I’m	  assuming	  that	  difference-­‐makers	  need	  not	  always	  make	  an	  actual	  difference.	  Much	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  
overdetermination	  cases	  has	  become	  hung	  up	  on	  this	  point:	  Alice’s	  failure	  to	  shoot	  makes	  no	  difference	  with	  re-­‐
spect	  to	  Christine’s	  death	  if	  Bill	  also	  shoots.	  
24	  I	  take	  this	  to	  be	  the	  same	  point	  as	  the	  one	  behind	  Bennett’s	  (2003,	  2007)	  test	  for	  overdetermination.	  
25	  There	  is	  likely	  much	  more	  to	  overdetermination	  than	  merely	  the	  number	  of	  causes	  and	  causal	  pathways.	  See,	  
e.g.,	  Bernstein	  (2010).	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(Genuine	  overdetermination):	  An	  effect	  is	  genuinely	  overdetermined	  when	  there	  is	  
more	  than	  one	  sufficient,	  distinct	  cause	  and	  more	  than	  one	  causal	  pathway	  for	  that	  ef-­‐
fect.	  
	  
Even	  if	  mental	  causes	  do	  not	  overdetermine	  their	  effects,	  I	  will	  be	  assuming	  that	  genuine	  overdetermi-­‐
nation	  sometimes	  actually	  occurs.26	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  whatever	  our	  best	  theory	  of	  event	  individuation	  turns	  
out	  to	  be,	  it	  should	  be	  able	  to	  account	  for	  at	  least	  some	  cases	  of	  genuine	  overdetermination.	  	  	   Instead	  of	  accepting	  either	  the	  Overdetermination	  Horn	  or	  the	  Epiphenomenalism	  Horn,	  I	  argue	  
that	  the	  Compatibilist	  should	  deny	  Kim’s	  dichotomy.	  While	  I	  agree	  with	  Kim	  that	  the	  NRP	  cannot	  easily	  
reject	  that	  the	  mental	  and	  the	  physical	  are	  distinct	  or	  that	  every	  physical	  event	  has	  a	  sufficient	  physical	  
cause,	  I	  think	  Exclusion	  stands	  on	  shakier	  ground.	  Recall	  the	  Exclusion	  principle:	  If	  an	  event	  at	  t	  has	  more	  
than	  one	  distinct,	  sufficient	  cause	  at	  t,	  then	  it	  is	  genuinely	  overdetermined.	  Kim	  states	  that	  Exclusion	  “is	  
virtually	  an	  analytic	  truth	  without	  much	  content”	  and	  he	  provides	  no	  further	  discussion	  (2005,	  51).27	  	  
3.3 Denying	  the	  Exclusion	  Principle	  
In	  the	  last	  few	  sections,	  I	  suggested	  that	  the	  causal	  structure	  of	  overdetermination	  and	  mental	  
causation	  should	  be	  differentiated	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  number	  of	  causal	  pathways.	  While	  mental	  causation	  
and	  overdetermination	  both	  involve	  two	  sufficient	  causes,	  the	  former	  only	  involves	  one	  causal	  pathway	  
while	  the	  latter	  involves	  two.	  However,	  the	  Exclusion	  principle	  as	  Kim	  formulates	  it	  cannot	  distinguish	  
cases	  of	  mental	  causation	  and	  overdetermination.	  Since	  the	  Exclusion	  principle	  makes	  use	  of	  only	  causal	  
sufficiency,	  it	  lumps	  mental	  causation	  in	  with	  genuine	  overdetermination.	  Above	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  
two	  come	  apart,	  and	  for	  that	  reason,	  in	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  Exclusion	  principle	  is	  false.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  I	  will	  be	  explicitly	  rejecting	  views	  that	  hold	  overdetermination	  does	  not	  occur	  because	  events	  are	  fragile	  (e.g.,	  
temporally,	  modally)	  and	  overdetermination	  is	  really	  joint	  causation	  underdescribed	  (e.g.,	  Collectivism).	  See	  Kim	  
(1993b)	  and	  Bunzl	  (1979)	  respectively.	  For	  discussion,	  see	  Schaffer	  (2003).	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  some	  cases	  of	  
seeming	  overdetermination	  might	  be	  best	  described	  by	  Collectivist	  theories,	  for	  example,	  presidential	  voting	  sce-­‐
narios.	  	  	  
27	  Barry	  Loewer	  agrees	  that	  this	  assumption	  cannot	  rightly	  be	  called	  analytic:	  2007,	  p.	  13.	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Instead,	  I	  argue	  the	  Causal	  Compatibilist	  should	  deny	  the	  Exclusion	  principle.	  As	  Kim	  formulates	  
the	  principle,	  it	  is	  simply	  false.	  As	  I’ve	  argued,	  mental	  causation	  is	  a	  case	  where	  an	  effect	  has	  more	  than	  
one	  distinct,	  sufficient	  cause,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  involve	  overdetermination.	  Perhaps	  Kim	  could	  attempt	  to	  
revise	  the	  Exclusion	  principle	  in	  light	  of	  our	  two	  causal	  concepts—sufficiency	  and	  difference	  making.	  
Suppose	  Kim	  defined	  the	  revised	  Exclusion	  principle	  as	  follows:	  If	  an	  event	  has	  more	  than	  one	  distinct	  
and	  sufficient	  cause,	  and	  it	  has	  more	  than	  one	  causal	  pathway,	  then	  it	  is	  genuinely	  overdetermined.	  This	  
version	  of	  the	  Exclusion	  principle	  will	  not	  be	  strong	  enough	  to	  exclude	  the	  mental	  cause,	  since,	  as	  I’ve	  
argued,	  mental	  causation	  involves	  more	  than	  one	  distinct	  and	  sufficient	  cause	  but	  only	  one	  causal	  path-­‐
way.	  
Perhaps	  Kim	  would	  respond	  that	  the	  Exclusion	  principle	  does	  not	  need	  to	  be	  revised.	  In	  fact,	  he	  
might	  suggest	  that	  the	  NRP	  has	  given	  him	  no	  reasons	  accept	  that	  cases	  of	  mental	  causation,	  epiphe-­‐
nomenalism,	  and	  overdetermination	  should	  be	  individuated	  with	  respect	  to	  causal	  difference	  making	  at	  
all.	  Instead,	  he	  might	  reply	  that	  causal	  sufficiency	  is	  the	  relevant	  causal	  concept	  for	  the	  Exclusion	  Prob-­‐
lem	  and	  possibly	  for	  all	  of	  science.28	  
First,	  such	  a	  response	  is	  not	  motivated	  by	  the	  causal	  contribution	  Kim	  requires	  of	  the	  mental,	  if	  
it	  is	  to	  be	  efficacious.	  That	  is,	  Kim	  does	  not	  hold	  that	  the	  NRP	  can	  simply	  show	  that	  the	  mental	  is	  suffi-­‐
cient	  for	  its	  cause	  in	  order	  to	  get	  out	  of	  the	  Exclusion	  Problem.	  Kim	  appeals	  to	  notions	  of	  causal	  work:	  
“Given	  that	  P	  has	  a	  physical	  cause	  P*,	  what	  causal	  work	  is	  left	  for	  M	  to	  contribute?”	  (1998,	  37).	  He	  also	  
suggests	  that	  the	  “causal	  contribution”	  of	  M	  is	  “totally	  mysterious”	  (2005b,	  48).	  Kim’s	  conclusion	  is	  that	  
since	  M	  does	  no	  additional	  causal	  work	  to	  bring	  about	  P*	  (and	  accepting	  that	  mental	  causation	  does	  not	  
involve	  overdetermination),	  M	  does	  not	  actually	  cause	  P.	  As	  Kim	  sometimes	  says,	  the	  mental	  is	  dispen-­‐
sable	  (1998,	  45).	  However,	  Kim	  also	  states	  that	  the	  mental	  needs	  to	  make	  a	  “causal	  difference”	  (1998,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Thanks	  to	  Paul	  Henne	  for	  bringing	  my	  attention	  to	  this	  objection.	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31;	  2005b,	  10).	  This	  last	  metaphor	  seems	  to	  indicate	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  mental	  should	  matter	  to	  
the	  occurrence	  of	  the	  effect—that	  the	  mental	  should	  be	  a	  difference-­‐maker.	  	  
Although	  it	  may	  be	  unlikely	  that	  Kim	  would	  accept	  all	  the	  formalism	  found	  in	  Woodward’s	  inter-­‐
ventionist	  theory	  of	  causation	  (and	  especially	  since	  Kim	  openly	  admits	  to	  holding	  a	  production	  view	  of	  
causation),	  it	  might	  be	  the	  case	  that	  Kim	  is	  committed	  to	  at	  least	  some	  intuitive	  notion	  of	  causal	  differ-­‐
ence	  making.	  Recall	  the	  discussion	  from	  Section	  1.2.	  Kim	  holds	  that	  the	  mental	  needs	  to	  perform	  extra	  
causal	  work	  above	  and	  beyond	  the	  physical.	  If	  Kim	  is	  referring	  only	  to	  our	  notion	  of	  causal	  sufficiency,	  it	  
would	  be	  irrelevant	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  mental	  performed	  any	  extra	  causal	  work.	  All	  we	  would	  need	  to	  
know	  is	  that	  the	  mental	  is	  sufficient	  for	  the	  effect	  and	  that	  the	  physical	  is	  sufficient	  for	  the	  effect.	  There	  
would	  be	  no	  impulse	  to	  “control	  for”	  the	  physical	  while	  manipulating	  the	  mental	  in	  order	  to	  see	  whether	  
or	  not	  the	  effect	  occurs.	  Further,	  if	  Kim	  would	  object	  to	  this	  appeal	  to	  causal	  difference	  making,	  it	  would	  
seem	  that	  his	  theory	  of	  causation	  leaves	  out	  very	  common	  and	  intuitive	  notion	  of	  causation.	  In	  particu-­‐
lar,	  causal	  difference	  making	  is	  important	  to	  scientific	  methodology	  (Woodward	  2003:	  10-­‐12),	  presuma-­‐
bly	  the	  type	  of	  causation	  Kim	  would	  like	  to	  account	  for	  on	  his	  view.	  
Instead,	  it	  seems	  that	  even	  Kim	  appeals	  to	  our	  causal	  concept	  of	  difference	  making	  to	  suggest	  
that	  the	  mental	  will	  need	  to	  make	  a	  difference	  to	  the	  occurrence	  of	  its	  effects.	  The	  objection	  described	  
above	  as	  rejecting	  any	  reference	  to	  causal	  difference	  making	  in	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  Exclusion	  Problem	  is	  ill	  





4 POTENTIAL	  OBJECTIONS	  
In	  section	  2,	  I	  introduced	  two	  notions	  of	  causation:	  difference	  making	  and	  sufficiency.	  I	  appealed	  
to	  Woodward’s	  interventionist	  framework	  in	  order	  to	  individuate	  the	  number	  of	  causal	  difference	  mak-­‐
ers	  in	  a	  given	  causal	  graph.	  Then	  I	  argued	  that	  by	  treating	  the	  mental	  and	  the	  physical	  as	  the	  same	  vari-­‐
able	  in	  a	  causal	  graph,	  they	  both	  make	  a	  difference	  to	  their	  effects	  together.	  My	  justification	  for	  this	  
claim	  is	  that	  other	  possible	  interventions	  break	  the	  supervenience	  relationship	  or	  require	  impossible	  
interventions.	  This	  solution	  is	  consistent	  with	  Woodward’s	  (2011)	  claim	  that	  when	  evaluating	  whether	  a	  
supervening	  property	  makes	  a	  difference	  to	  its	  effects,	  then	  we	  should	  not	  control	  for	  (or	  hold	  fixed)	  the	  
supervenience	  base.	  In	  section	  3,	  I	  have	  just	  argued	  that	  if	  the	  solution	  I	  propose	  in	  section	  2	  is	  correct,	  
then	  the	  NRP	  can	  get	  out	  of	  Kim’s	  Exclusion	  Problem	  by	  denying	  the	  Exclusion	  principle.	  I	  have	  also	  ar-­‐
gued	  that	  my	  solution	  does	  not	  deny	  the	  distinctness	  of	  the	  mental	  and	  the	  physical.	  Here	  I	  think	  the	  
NRP	  should	  appeal	  to	  multiple	  realizability	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  Distinctness.	  Then	  I	  argued	  that	  the	  
mental	  does	  not	  overdetermine	  its	  effects.	  I	  proposed	  a	  new	  definition	  of	  overdetermination	  based	  on	  
our	  notions	  of	  causal	  sufficiency	  and	  difference	  making.	  Ultimately,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  Kim’s	  Exclusion	  
principle	  is	  false	  because	  it	  fails	  to	  distinguish	  between	  cases	  of	  mental	  causation	  and	  overdetermina-­‐
tion.	  So,	  the	  NRP	  has	  no	  reason	  to	  accept	  it	  and	  she	  has	  a	  way	  out	  of	  the	  Exclusion	  Problem.	  
In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  consider	  a	  few	  possible	  objections	  to	  the	  solution	  I’ve	  just	  presented.	  I	  will	  
conclude	  that	  my	  solution	  does	  not	  violate	  Efficacy	  or	  Closure.	  The	  Efficacy	  objection	  holds	  that	  causal	  
sufficiency	  and	  causal	  difference	  making	  never	  produce	  different	  answers	  to	  the	  individuation	  of	  causes,	  
but	  as	  I’ve	  argued	  above,	  they	  do	  come	  apart	  in	  cases	  of	  mental	  causation.	  The	  Closure	  objection	  rests	  
on	  a	  confusion	  between	  causal	  sufficiency	  and	  causal	  difference	  making.	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4.1 Efficacy	  Objection	  
Bernstein	  (2010)	  argues	  that	  Compatibilists	  cannot	  rely	  on	  solutions	  like	  mine	  because	  Efficacy	  
entails	  that	  mental	  causes	  overdetermine	  their	  effects.	  First,	  Bernstein	  argues	  that	  causal	  Compatibilists	  
rely	  on	  an	  intuitive	  notion	  of	  overdetermination,	  where	  cases	  that	  involve	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  distinct-­‐
ness	  between	  the	  causes	  do	  not	  count	  as	  overdetermined,	  rather	  than	  an	  ontological	  notion.	  However,	  
according	  to	  Bernstein:	  “It	  is	  this	  antecedent	  ontological	  commitment—a	  commitment	  to	  an	  extra	  set	  of	  
causes—that	  generates	  overdetermination”	  (2010,	  28).	  She	  then	  examines	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  
ontological	  commitment	  that	  generates	  overdetermination	  and	  Efficacy.	  Recall	  that	  Efficacy	  states:	  The	  
instantiations	  of	  mental	  properties	  can	  and	  do	  cause	  other	  physical	  and	  mental	  properties	  to	  be	  instan-­‐
tiated.	  Efficacy,	  she	  argues,	  requires	  that	  mental	  causes	  have	  both	  potential	  causal	  processes	  and	  fol-­‐
low-­‐throughs	  (or	  actual,	  completed	  causal	  processes)	  connecting	  them	  to	  their	  effects.29	  Her	  objection	  
ultimately	  relies	  on	  explicating	  Efficacy	  in	  terms	  of	  requiring	  unique	  causal	  processes	  (both	  potential	  and	  
actual)	  from	  mental	  causes	  to	  their	  effects.30	  	  
In	  order	  to	  deny	  that	  mental	  causation	  involves	  overdetermination,	  the	  causal	  Compatibilist	  
needs	  to	  deny	  the	  ontological	  commitment	  to	  two	  causes,	  but	  unfortunately,	  according	  Bernstein,	  nei-­‐
ther	  way	  is	  consistent	  with	  Efficacy.	  The	  Compatibilist	  can	  either	  deny	  that	  the	  mental	  has	  causal	  poten-­‐
tial,	  or	  she	  can	  deny	  that	  the	  mental	  has	  causal	  follow-­‐through.	  However,	  causal	  potential	  seems	  to	  be	  
required	  by	  Efficacy.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  mental	  causes	  will	  always	  fail	  to	  be	  efficacious	  (given	  Closure).	  
Unfortunately,	  on	  Bernstein’s	  argument,	  the	  mental	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  cause	  effects,	  but	  it	  simply	  
never	  does.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  By	  ‘causal	  process’,	  Bernstein	  does	  not	  mean	  to	  appeal	  to	  the	  philosophically	  loaded	  version	  found	  in	  other	  
theories	  (e.g.,	  Salmon	  1984).	  Instead,	  she	  means	  a	  type	  of	  unspecified	  causal	  connection	  between	  the	  cause	  and	  
effect.	  The	  difference	  between	  a	  potential	  causal	  process	  and	  a	  follow-­‐through	  can	  be	  shown	  in	  a	  case	  of	  asym-­‐
metric	  preemption.	  Suppose	  Suzy	  throws	  her	  ball	  faster	  than	  Billy	  throws	  his	  ball,	  and	  so	  Suzy’s	  ball	  shatters	  the	  
window	  while	  Billy’s	  ball	  only	  flies	  through	  the	  air	  where	  the	  window	  once	  stood.	  Suzy’s	  throw	  is	  a	  cause	  with	  fol-­‐
low-­‐through	  while	  Billy’s	  throw	  is	  only	  a	  potential	  causal	  process	  (ibid.,	  29).	  	  
30	  Note	  that	  Efficacy	  requires	  that	  mental	  properties	  cause	  their	  effects	  qua	  mental	  rather	  than	  inheriting	  their	  
causal	  efficacy	  from	  their	  subvenient	  base.	  See	  Horgan	  (1989).	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Bernstein	  likely	  rejects	  the	  Compatibilist’s	  causal	  pathway	  solution	  because	  she	  assumes	  that	  
the	  numbers	  of	  sufficient	  causes	  and	  of	  “causal	  processes”	  are	  always	  equal	  once	  individuated.	  Bern-­‐
stein	  says:	  “There	  are	  two	  causal	  processes	  in	  virtue	  of	  there	  being	  two	  causes:	  accept	  the	  causes	  and	  
the	  complete	  causal	  processes	  come	  attached”	  (ibid.,	  47).	  However,	  as	  I	  argued	  in	  Section	  2.3,	  this	  is	  not	  
always	  the	  case.	  Mental	  causation	  might	  be	  an	  instance	  in	  which	  the	  number	  of	  causes	  does	  not	  deter-­‐
mine	  the	  number	  of	  causal	  pathways.	  Causal	  Compatibilists	  need	  not	  accept	  this	  relationship	  between	  
causes	  and	  causal	  pathways.	  
4.2 Closure	  Objection	  
Another	  objection	  might	  be	  that	  I’ve	  violated	  Closure	  in	  my	  description	  of	  Figure	  2.	  It	  might	  ap-­‐
pear	  that	  the	  causal	  mechanism	  runs	  from	  M	  to	  M*;	  the	  objector	  argues	  that,	  in	  my	  diagram,	  P	  inherits	  
this	  causal	  mechanism.	  Yet,	  if	  P	  inherits	  its	  causal	  efficacy	  from	  M,	  then	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  NRP	  has	  de-­‐
nied	  the	  sufficiency	  of	  the	  physical.	  
I	  agree	  that	  were	  this	  NRP	  solution	  to	  violate	  Closure,	  this	  would	  be	  a	  bad	  outcome.	  However,	  
such	  an	  objection	  confuses	  causal	  pathways	  with	  sufficiency.	  Recall	  that	  I’ve	  defined	  ‘causal	  pathway’	  in	  
terms	  of	  difference	  making.	  Nothing	  I’ve	  said	  suggests	  that	  P	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  P*.	  Likewise,	  there	  is	  no	  
reason	  to	  think	  that	  having	  more	  than	  one	  sufficient	  cause	  is	  problematic.	  Consider	  the	  following	  causal	  
chain:	  ABC.	  We	  might	  say	  that	  A	  is	  sufficient	  for	  C	  and	  then	  that	  B	  is	  sufficient	  for	  C,	  but	  that	  does	  
not	  entail	  that	  A’s	  (or	  B’s)	  sufficiency	  is	  now	  suspect.	  
	  Conceding	  the	  point	  about	  sufficiency,	  the	  objector	  (as	  well	  as	  Kim)	  might	  press	  the	  issue	  of	  in-­‐
heriting	  causal	  efficacy.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  P’s	  purported	  inheritance	  of	  causal	  efficacy	  from	  M	  threat-­‐
ens	  Closure.	  However,	  the	  talk	  of	  one	  state	  inheriting	  causal	  efficacy	  from	  the	  other	  (where	  the	  inheritor	  
is	  either	  P	  or	  M)	  is	  misleading.	  The	  causal	  mechanism	  between	  the	  two	  sets	  of	  events	  is	  equally	  M’s	  as	  it	  
is	  P’s.	  Since	  M	  and	  P	  only	  count	  as	  difference-­‐makers	  when	  both	  are	  present,	  we	  might	  say	  that	  the	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causal	  mechanism	  belongs	  to	  both.31	  As	  Shapiro	  (2010)	  says	  treating	  M	  as	  a	  free	  rider	  “involves	  confus-­‐
ing	  M’s	  causing	  P*	  with	  M’s	  making	  a	  causal	  contribution	  to	  P*	  that	  is	  additional	  to	  the	  contribution	  that	  
P	  makes”	  (600).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  Kim	  believes	  the	  mental	  needs	  to	  make	  an	  additional	  “causal	  contribu-­‐
tion”	  to	  the	  effect	  in	  order	  to	  be	  efficacious	  (2005,	  47).	  This	  assumption	  is	  what	  led	  Kim	  to	  suggest	  that	  
Exclusion	  applies	  immediately	  after	  the	  NRP	  rejects	  mental	  causation	  as	  a	  case	  of	  genuine	  overdetermi-­‐
nation.	  The	  Compatibilist	  need	  not	  agree	  with	  Kim	  that	  Exclusion	  applies	  here.	  Instead,	  she	  can	  reject	  
the	  assumption	  that	  the	  mental	  has	  to	  add	  anything	  new	  to	  the	  causal	  situation	  (Wilson	  2010b,	  Paul	  
2007,	  Shapiro	  2010).	  
If	  I	  have	  successfully	  defended	  the	  distinction	  between	  sufficient	  causes	  and	  causal	  pathways,	  
the	  NRP	  has	  a	  way	  out	  of	  the	  Exclusion	  Problem.	  She	  can	  provide	  a	  more	  intuitive	  definition	  of	  overde-­‐
termination	  and	  then	  she	  can	  differentiate	  sufficient	  causes	  and	  causal	  pathways	  in	  terms	  of	  causal	  suf-­‐
ficiency	  and	  causal	  difference	  making.	  The	  NRP	  can	  defend	  a	  causal	  Compatibilist	  solution	  in	  which	  she	  
accepts	  No	  Overdetermination	  and	  Efficacy	  but	  rejects	  Exclusion.	  Her	  distinction	  between	  causes	  and	  
causal	  pathways	  shows	  why	  Kim’s	  formulation	  of	  the	  Exclusion	  principle	  is	  incomplete—it	  only	  makes	  
use	  of	  our	  causal	  concept	  of	  causal	  sufficiency.	  
4.3 Conclusions	  
I	  have	  provided	  the	  NRP	  with	  a	  response	  to	  Kim’s	  dilemma.	  Instead	  of	  accepting	  either	  the	  
Epiphenomenalism	  Horn	  or	  the	  Overdetermination	  Horn,	  I	  suggest	  the	  NRP	  reject	  Kim’s	  false	  dichotomy.	  
The	  NRP	  should	  reject	  Kim’s	  version	  of	  Exclusion	  because	  it	  is	  inadequately	  formulated.	  I	  also	  argued	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  This	  is	  what	  I	  take	  to	  be	  the	  problem	  with	  Alyssa	  Ney’s	  (2009)	  argument	  that	  Foundationalists	  about	  causation,	  
who	  think	  that	  all	  of	  our	  difference-­‐making	  talk	  is	  ultimately	  grounded	  in	  facts	  about	  the	  type	  of	  causation	  discov-­‐
ered	  “in	  the	  real	  world”	  by	  way	  of	  scientific	  investigation,	  ought	  to	  land	  on	  Kim’s	  side	  of	  the	  argument.	  Ney	  thinks	  
that	  science	  indicates	  that	  physical	  causes	  are	  productive,	  and	  while	  this	  is	  contentious,	  I	  think	  a	  Foundationalist	  
about	  causation	  can	  even	  admit	  that	  our	  difference-­‐making	  talk	  is	  grounded	  in	  a	  production	  view	  of	  causation.	  
However,	  Kim’s	  conclusion	  does	  not	  follow	  directly.	  A	  causal	  Compatibilist	  might	  suggest	  the	  problem	  with	  Ney’s	  
argument	  is	  that	  she,	  like	  Kim	  and	  Bernstein,	  assumes	  that	  the	  mental	  needs	  to	  causally	  contribute	  something	  ex-­‐
tra,	  as	  opposed	  to	  merely	  causally	  contributing.	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that	  the	  NRP	  should	  specify	  her	  own	  definition	  of	  overdetermination.	  Both	  should	  require	  individuation	  
of	  causal	  structure	  according	  to	  the	  number	  of	  sufficient	  causes	  and	  the	  number	  of	  causal	  pathways.	  
The	  NRP	  should	  argue	  that	  mental	  causes	  are	  neither	  excluded	  as	  causes	  nor	  overdetermine	  their	  ef-­‐
fects;	  mental	  causation	  involves	  two	  causes	  but	  only	  one	  causal	  pathway.	  I	  considered	  some	  objections,	  
but	  ultimately	  one	  objection	  rested	  on	  the	  intuition	  that	  causal	  sufficiency	  and	  difference	  making	  do	  not	  
come	  apart	  and	  another	  objection	  rested	  on	  a	  confusion	  about	  the	  distinction	  between	  causal	  suffi-­‐
ciency	  and	  causal	  difference	  making.	  Ultimately,	  I	  concluded	  that	  NRP	  have	  little	  reason	  to	  be	  convinced	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